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This dissertation explores the role of search frictions in macroeconomics and
highlights how these frictions influence micro-level decisions which in turn affect
aggregated outcomes.
Chapter 1 examines how individuals entering the job market during a reces-
sion can suffer persistent wage losses. I document how entering the job market
during a recession not only affects wage outcomes but also severely impinges on
early between-career changes. I then build a model that shows how entering the
job market during a recession hampers early career mobility which is critical to-
wards facilitating learning about one’s comparative advantage and accumulating
human capital specific to one’s ideal career. Consequently, individuals who choose
to switch careers post-recession are forced to restart at lower wages as they lack
‘relevant’ career-specific human capital and certainty over their aptitude in their
new careers. Permanent misallocation also arises when marginal workers who, hav-
ing accumulated sufficient career-specific human capital, find it too costly to switch
careers in the recovery. Persistent wage losses are a result of misallocation and ex-
perience gaps, both of which take time to correct.
Chapter 2 looks at how consumer search behavior and the durability of the
product affect firms’ strategic pricing decisions. In the model, search is costly and
consumers do not get to sample all prices in the market but rather have some positive
probability of meeting only one or two sellers. In addition, consumers purchase
goods that do not perish immediately and are able to postpone transactions. Firms
face two types of customers: loyals and shoppers. The presence of a customer
base and search frictions imply that a firm takes into account the consumer search
method when setting prices. Durability of the product and the consumer’s ability
to postpone purchases suggest that consumers have greater bargaining power over
the maximum price the firm is able to charge. In the numerical exercises, I show
that all else equal, 1) the range of prices supported under durable goods is larger
than the range of prices supported for non-durables, and 2) money is not neutral
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Chapter 1: Born Under a Bad Sign: The Cost of Entering the Job
Market During a Recession
Nearly half of all wage gains accrued to an individual between the age of 18 and 46
occur before age 30, suggesting that the early years of an individual’s working life are
critical to his overall earnings growth.1 The recent continuing weakness in the labor
market and overall tepid recovery, however, has severely affected the employment
prospects for young workers.2 Existing literature by Kahn (2010), Oreopoulos et al.
(2012), Gregg and Tominey (2005) and Oyer (2006) document the persistence of
wage losses stemming from economic conditions at the time of entry into the labor
market. For the US economy, Kahn (2010) looks at white male college graduates
who entered the job market prior to, during and after the 1980s recession and ob-
serves that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate at the time of
entry leads to an initial wage loss of 6 to 7 percent. Moreover, she finds that the
negative wage effect is persistent and that agents who enter the job market in a bad
economy continue to suffer a wage loss of 2.5 percent 15 years after entry.3 While the
1 See BLS Economic News Release, 25 Jul 2012 “Number of Jobs Held, Labor Market Activity,
and Earnings Growth Among the Youngest Baby Boomers: Results from a Longitudinal Survey
Summary”.
2 Elsby et al. (2010) note that young workers aged 16-25, less educated workers and workers
from ethnic minorities observe sharper increases in joblessness during recessions.
3 Oreopoulous et al (2012) focus on Canadian college graduates and find that individuals who
enter the job market during a recession suffer an initial wage penalty of 9 percent. These wage
above literature has concentrated on establishing a link between initial entry condi-
tions and future wage outcomes, the primary focus of this paper is on examining the
channel through which these persistent wage losses occur. In particular, this paper
proposes that weak labor markets inhibit early career transitions which are critical
to learning about comparative advantage and to the accumulation of human capital
specific to one’s ideal career. The speed of learning and accumulation of specific
human capital that is non-transferable across careers are the key factors which keep
wages of those who enter during a recession depressed long after the economy has
recovered.
I first document how career mobility varies over the life cycle using data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 and show that entering in a recession
has a negative impact on career transitions. The early years of an individual’s
working life are dominated by between-career job changes. The frequency of these
between-career changes, however, falls sharply with age. In contrast, within-career
job changes are less predominant in the early years of one’s working life but observe
a much gentler decline with age. Importantly, entering the job market during a
recession severely impinges on an individual’s ability to conduct between-career job
changes while within-career job changes remain mostly unscathed.
losses, though not permanent, only fade 10 years after entry into the labor market. Gregg and
Tominey (2005) find that the higher incidence of youth unemployment stemming from entry into
a recession has severely persistent negative wage effects. Oyer (2006) looks at PhD economists
and observes that even for this subset of the labor market, initial conditions matter for long-term
outcomes. Overall, the growing empirical literature points toward the harmful effects that initial
economic conditions can have on individuals’ wage trajectories.
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Given these facts, I build a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model that demonstrates
how reduced opportunities to switch careers early on cause slowdowns in learning
about comparative advantage and increased accumulation of ‘irrelevant’ human cap-
ital, both of which affects individuals’ subsequent job search behavior and future
wage outcomes. I then decompose the wage gap suffered by individuals who enter
during recessions and show that diminished opportunities to switch careers early
on generate misallocation and experience gaps. These misallocation and experience
gaps take time to correct and are the main components driving the persistence in
wage loss. In the model, a wage gap of 6 percent continues to persist even after the
recessionary shock has dissipated and only fades completely 60 quarters after entry
into the labor market.
Learning about comparative advantage and accumulating ‘relevant’ human capital
are two key elements that contribute towards wage growth. Intuitively, individuals
entering the job market are uncertain about which career is best suited to their
abilities. In the early years of their working life, individuals engage in job experi-
mentation to learn more about their comparative advantage. Recessions, however,
inhibit early job-to-job transitions and overall job experimentation. As such, even
individuals who are continuously employed suffer a slowdown in their learning pro-
cess, as individuals who discover that they have poor aptitude at their current job
are unable to switch careers and learn about their aptitude at an alternative career.
However, learning by itself may not be sufficient to replicate the degree of persistent
3
wage losses seen in the data. When the economy recovers, individuals should be
able to re-start their job experimentation, learn their aptitude at various careers,
and switch into a career at which they have comparative advantage. This implies a
rapid catch-up in wages post-recession. Thus, to account for persistent wage scarring
effects, I consider how the accumulation of career-specific human capital interacts
with individuals’ learning processes to affect their job-finding prospects and future
wage outcomes. In particular, prolonged weakness in the labor market can lead
to an increased accumulation of ‘irrelevant’ human capital, i.e. experience in tasks
at which the individual has comparative disadvantage. When labor markets are
weak and individuals are prevented from moving into alternative jobs, they remain
‘stuck’ in their current vocation and as such accumulate experience that may be
non-transferable to their next career. Once the economy recovers, a worker who has
learnt that he has poor aptitude in his current career is faced with a discrete choice
of discarding all the experience he has gained thus far and switching into a career
where he has only a noisy signal of his aptitude, or remaining in his current career.
An individual who switches careers may be forced to restart at lower rungs of the
wage ladder, as his accumulated human capital up to this point is irrelevant to-
wards his new career. Alternatively, an individual who has accumulated significant
amounts of career-specific human capital may find it too costly to switch careers
and may optimally choose to remain in a career at which he has comparative dis-
advantage. Poor initial conditions, therefore, can cause persistent wage losses by
affecting the individual’s ability to climb the wage ladder, as well as by raising the
probability of permanent misallocation.
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In addition to its direct impact on a worker’s output, the specificity of human cap-
ital and lack of certainty about an individual’s productivity in his new career also
modify an individual’s job-finding prospects. High perceived aptitude and the devel-
opment of relevant experience raise the worker’s probability of finding a job as well
as the wage compensation he can demand. Intuitively, firms prefer to hire workers
who bring more effective labor input into production. By slowing down learning
about comparative advantage and by fostering accumulation of irrelevant human
capital, recessions adversely affect an individual’s future job-finding and retention
probabilities, and consequently the wage share that a worker can demand.
While this is not the first paper to examine how poor initial conditions affect long
run wage outcomes, the literature has yet to arrive at a consensus on the mechanism
explaining these persistent wage losses. Notably, the standard labor search model
cannot account for persistent wage scars. In the canonical Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides (DMP) labor search model, workers and firms split the value of a job.
An increase in aggregate productivity raises the value of a job and encourages firms
to create more vacancies. Consequently, improvements in the job-finding rate exert
upward pressure on wages, resulting in wages recovering with the aggregate state.
Hornstein et al. (2007) find that the canonical labor search model can only ratio-
nalize a very small amount of dispersion in the wage data. Extending the standard
labor search model to incorporate on-the-job search does not help to explain persis-
tent wage scars. Barlevy (2006) incorporates on-the-job search and heterogeneous
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workers into the standard labor search model and studies the sullying effects of a
recession. He finds that recessions act toward suppressing worker reallocation and
contribute towards a decline in aggregate match quality. Nonetheless, aggregate
match quality rebounds with the recovery of the economy in his model, and there-
fore his model gives rise to little or no persistent wage losses. Moscarini (2001)
considers a model where individuals know their comparative advantage but are,
however, willing to take jobs where they have comparative disadvantage during a
recession as it is costly to wait for the right job. However, workers can switch to their
ideal job once the economy recovers. While Moscarini (2001) and Barlevy (2002)
are instructive in showing how mismatch can arise in a recession, their models do
not focus on explaining how persistent wage losses can arise.
Pissarides (1992) suggests that persistent wage losses may arise if workers’ skills
depreciate while unemployed.4 This mechanism is likely to be most powerful dur-
ing sluggish recoveries when unemployment remains high and many individuals are
unemployed for long spells. The relatively short durations of past recessions and
the quick recoveries that accompanied them, however, imply that a high rate of
human capital depreciation would be required to generate the persistent wage losses
observed in the data.
In a seminal paper, Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) focus on implicit contracts and
4 More specifically, Pissarides (1992) demonstrates how skill loss can negatively affect the com-
position of quality among the pool of unemployed workers. Firms create less job openings when
the composition of the unemployment pool worsens.
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find that current wages depend heavily on initial economic conditions only when
mobility is costly.5 This implies that a model of wage contracts and past wage
premiums alone is unable to predict persistent wage scars, since agents are able to
move across jobs in a recovery and start new wage contracts that depend on eco-
nomic conditions at the time of hiring.
This paper contributes to the above literature by offering a complementary expla-
nation as to how persistent wage losses may arise from poor entry conditions. By
focusing on how recessions affect the learning of one’s comparative advantage as well
as the accumulation of irrelevant human capital, this paper demonstrates a channel
through which persistent wage losses could arise that is also consistent with the
empirical evidence on career mobility over the life cycle. Incorporating learning as
well as career-specific human capital into my model allows me to match the rapid
decline in between-career changes with experience, as well as the relative prominence
of within-career job changes in the latter part of one’s working life. As such, my
model is able to demonstrate how the life cycle and business cycle aspects of job
search behavior can drive persistent wage losses by affecting the amount of learning
and human capital accumulation of young workers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.1 reviews the related lit-
erature whilst Section 1.2 describes the empirical motivation and data that will be
5 In fact, Beaudry and Dinardo (1991) find that when mobility is costless, current wages are
pegged to the lowest unemployment rate since the start of a job.
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used to calibrate the model. Section 1.3 presents the model. Section 5 lists the
calibration process while Section 6 provides results from a numerical simulation.
Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
The importance of job mobility in the early years of an individual’s working life to his
overall wage growth has been well documented. Using the Longitudinal Employer-
Employee Data (LEED) file for the period spanning 1957Q1 to 1972Q4, Topel and
Ward (1992) find that more than half of young workers have held six or more full
time jobs ten years after their entry into the labor market. In addition, the average
quarterly wage growth associated with a between-job change is about 12 percent for
an individual with less than 7 years of working experience, compared to an average
1.75 percent quarterly wage growth within jobs. In contrast, the average quarterly
wage growth rate associated with a between-job change is halved for an older worker
with more than 7 years of experience. This suggests that early between-job switch-
ing is important for wage growth in the first few years of an individual’s working life,
but this effect diminishes as a worker ages. To account for these observations, Neal
(1999) posits that workers follow a two-stage search strategy. In his model, a worker
must learn about both his career match and his employer match quality. Defining a
‘complex’ job change as one which involves a change in both industry and occupa-
tion as well as employer, and a ‘simple’ job change as one which involves a change
in employer, but not a change in both occupation and industry, Neal finds that the
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early years of an individual’s working life are marked by complex job changes while
the latter years of an individual’s working life tend to involve simple job changes.
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), he
finds that at least 70 percent of high school graduates and about 50 percent of
college graduates undergo a career change - i.e. a complex change of jobs - after
starting their first full-time job. The frequency of complex job changes, however,
is decreasing with experience. In contrast, the probability of a simple job change
increases as one gains experience in the labor market. Given this evidence, Neal
concludes that individuals initially search for a career and only concentrate their
search efforts towards finding an employer match once a suitable career has been
found.
Pavan (2011) updates the results of Neal (1999) and finds that wage gains from
simple and complex job changes are similar in magnitude and account for about
45 percent of total wage growth in the first decade for workers with at least some
college education. Importantly, Pavan documents that the accumulation of career-
specific human capital (same occupation, same industry) contributes significantly
to wage returns. On average, ten years of career-specific tenure gives rise to an
increase in log wages by 0.2 points for college graduates. In contrast, Parent (2000)
and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) find that the wage returns from accumulat-
ing firm-specific human capital are negligible once one controls for either industry-
or occupation-specific human capital. Conceptually, the transferability of human
capital between jobs depends crucially on the similarity of skill sets required at var-
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ious jobs. Intuitively, jobs within the same career should share many similarities in
required skill sets. These empirical findings, therefore, underscore the importance
of the career search process and the accumulation of relevant career-specific human
capital for maximizing wage returns. This paper attempts to see how both of these
drivers of wage growth are affected during a recession. As this study is interested
in how recessions affect job shopping and ultimately wage growth paths, I focus on
the subset of labor market participants that most actively engage in job-shopping:
namely labor market entrants.
Importantly, incorporating learning about one’s comparative advantage into the
standard labor search model is crucial towards matching the facts about life cycle
job mobility and wage growth. Recent work by Gervais et al. (2011) and Papa-
georgiou (2013) incorporate learning about one’s type into a labor search model.
In the former, the authors show that the introduction of occupational learning into
a labor search model can explain why job separations and consequently unemploy-
ment declines with age. Young workers typically enter into unemployment or change
jobs more frequently at a younger age as they learn about their occupational fit or
true calling. In the latter, Papageorgiou (2013) demonstrates that learning about
one’s comparative advantage enables him to match gross workers flows and repli-
cate the declining rate of occupational mobility over one’s lifetime. Felli and Harris
(1996) incorporate learning about one’s productivity at a job into a model with
firm-specific human capital. In their model, workers experience learning-by-doing
and accumulate human capital that is specific to the firm rather than to a career.
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While conceptually similar to this paper, Felli and Harris (1996) focus on the wage
determination process, and do not examine how business cycle conditions and search
frictions may interact to affect the wage path of an individual. In contrast to the
above literature that focuses mainly on wage determination and mobility over the
life-cycle, this paper examines how initial business cycle conditions impact life cycle
considerations in job search, which in turn affect future wage outcomes.
Delacroix and Shi (2006) show how observed concave wage profiles over the life cycle
can be explained in a model where workers conduct on-the-job search and climb the
wage ladder one rung at a time. As past wage compensations form a worker’s cur-
rent reservation wage, they show how one can generate wage dispersion in a model
as well as attain serial correlation in wage outcomes. Their paper suggests that
current wage outcomes may be pegged to past wage premiums. Similar to Delacroix
and Shi(2006), this paper also demonstrates that current wage outcomes may be
benchmarked by past wages received. However, persistence in wage outcomes in my
model is not a product of past wage premiums alone but is also a function of the
evolution of relevant human capital. The amount of wage compensation a worker
can demand is a function of his effective labor input. The presence of irrelevant
human capital impinges on a worker’s ability to demand higher wages in a new
career. Hence, persistence in wage returns and slow climbing of the wage ladder
are outcomes of the evolution of relevant human capital. In addition, a worker who
chooses to remain in a career where he has comparative disadvantage also experi-
ences slower growth in specific human capital due to his lack of innate aptitude at
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that job. This again gives rise to persistence in wage losses.
Another related paper by Adda et al. (2013) finds that continuously employed young
workers who enter the labor market during a recession suffer earnings losses of about
1 to 2 percent in net present value terms over a 15 year horizon. They attribute
this loss to the loss of search capital. In their model, workers accumulate firm-
specific human capital on the job. Firm-worker match quality is heterogeneous
and drawn only when a firm and worker meet. Recessions inhibit both current
and future job-to-job transitions as workers accumulate firm-specific human capital
while at a job and forego searching for better match quality even after the economy
recovers. This paper differs from Adda et al (2013) in two aspects: 1) human capital
is career-specific rather than match-specific and 2) individuals must learn about
their comparative advantage. These two aspects allow me to match the evidence
documented by Neal (1999) that workers continue to conduct simple job changes
and change employers later in their working life while agents spend the early part
of their working life searching for an appropriate career. If the accumulation of
firm-specific human capital was the only factor driving persistently decreased job
mobility among workers who enter in a recession, then these individuals would also
conduct fewer simple job changes post-recession. However, this is not consistent
with the data. In what follows, I will demonstrate that job search strategies related
to finding the appropriate career are most affected by the recession while the impact
on individuals’ job search within the same career is minimal.
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1.2 Data
To observe how job search behavior of labor market entrants varies with the business
cycle, I use panel data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79).
The survey tracks information on the employment and wage histories of a sample
of individuals initially aged 14 to 21 years old in 1979 to today. For my analysis, I
restrict the sample to the period spanning 1979 to 2006. I do not examine the data
for subsequent years, as any declines in wage outcomes in those years could be due
to the Great Recession rather than persistent initial conditions.
I restrict my focus to white males, of which there are 3790 in the sample in 1979.
I exclude 377 individuals who spent 4 or more consecutive years in the military
in the early stages of their career.6 If an individual spent less than 4 consecutive
years in the military, I drop the observations for which he was on active duty. I
exclude another 146 individuals who displayed weak labor market attachment, i.e.
individuals who spent more than 15 years out of the labor force. In addition, I
delete another 126 individuals who dropped out of the sample and were interviewed
fewer than 5 years. Finally, I drop another 14 individuals whose initial labor market
attachment cannot be observed. At this point, I have 3246 individuals and 48232
6 While being in the military may be in itself a career choice, individuals who enter into the
military tend to locked into a military career for the length of their contract. Since it is difficult to
quantify the relevance of the occupational skills attained while in the military, there are potentially
large miscoding errors when these individuals re-enter the labor market and search for jobs. In
particular, it is difficult to ascertain the relevant years of specific human capital experience that
may apply to private sector jobs for individuals who choose to re-enter the job market after a spell
with the military.
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annual observations in my sample. As wage returns are likely to be affected by
the presence of unobservables, I further limit my analysis to a more homogeneous
group of individuals. In particular, I focus on two separate sub-samples. The first
sub-sample consists of white male college graduates with four year college degrees.
This sub-sample consists of 433 individuals and 24350 quarterly observations. The
second sub-sample comprises white male high school graduates and consists of 717
individuals and 44023 quarterly observations.
Wages are measured using the usual rate of pay at the time of the interview and
are deflated using the Consumer Price Index. A key change in the structure of the
NLSY79 is that from 1994 onwards, the survey changed from an annual frequency
to being conducted once every two years. Thus, the wage rate reported for each job
reflects only the wage reported at the time of the survey period. While an individual
may hold more than one job in a given period, I focus on the main job at which an
individual spends the most hours working within a given quarter.
1.2.1 Verifying Persistent Wage Losses
As a quick verification, I replicate the exercise in Kahn(2010) and show how initial
conditions can exert a lasting impact on wage outcomes. In her paper, Kahn looks
at how the unemployment rate at entry affects log hourly wages for white male
college graduates. In particular, she conducts the following regression:
wit = α0 + α1u0,i + α2u0,i ∗ Pot.Expit + βXit + εit (1.1)
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where wit is the log hourly wage of individual i at time t and u0,i is the main re-
gressor of interest, the national unemployment rate at entry. u0,i ∗ Pot.Expit is
the interaction of the unemployment rate at entry with potential experience. This
variable captures the extent to which initial unemployment rates continue to weigh
on current wages. A negative coefficient on u0,i combined with a positive coefficient
on u0,i ∗Pot.Expit implies that entering during a recession generates an initial drop
in wages followed by subsequent catch-up over time. Xit is a set of control vari-
ables which includes the individual’s potential experience, the square of potential
experience, the AFQT score, which acts a proxy for underlying ability, the current
unemployment rate as well as regional dummies. To account for selection effects
and the endogenous timing of labor market entry, Kahn conducts a separate instru-
mental variables regression (IV) where she instruments for the unemployment rate
at entry with the unemployment rate at the modal age of graduation. Similarly, the
interaction term u0,i ∗Pot.Expit is instrumented with the product of the unemploy-
ment rate at the modal age of graduation and potential experience. Accordingly,
the first stage regressions take the form of:
u0,i = π0 + π1um,i + π2um,i ∗ Pot.Expit + δ1Xit + εit (1.2)
u0,i ∗ Pot.Expit = π3 + π4um,i + π5um,i ∗ Pot.Expit + δ2Xit + ξit (1.3)
where um,i refers to the unemployment rate at the modal age of graduation. In the
NLYSY79 data, the modal age of college graduation is 22 years. While I replicate
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Kahn’s empirical exercise, it should be noted that my results differ slightly from
Kahn (2010) because that I focus on the hourly wage rate for the individual’s main
job in a given quarter while the time period in Kahn’s analysis is a year.
Table A.1 documents the effect of the initial unemployment rate on log wages. Col-
umn (1) of Table A.1 shows the results from an OLS wage regression while Column
(2) presents the results from the IV regression. All regression coefficients are re-
ported in terms of percentage points. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
In addition, standard errors in all regressions are clustered by birth cohort year.
Similar to Kahn(2010), I find that a one percentage point increase in the initial
national unemployment rate leads to an initial decline in log wages of about 5 to 6.5
percentage points. More importantly, the interaction term of potential experience
with the initial national unemployment rate suggests that this wage loss does not
disappear quickly and is in fact very persistent. Columns(3) and (4) replicate the
analysis in the previous two columns and use the geographical variation over Census
regions to look at the impact of the regional unemployment rate at entry on log wage
outcomes. In this specification, the initial, modal age and current unemployment
rates are all measured at the regional level. A one percentage point increase in the
regional unemployment rate at entry leads to an initial wage loss of about 4 to 5
percent. Again the interaction terms of potential experience with initial unemploy-
ment rate at entry imply no appreciable catch-up in wages over time. Table A.2
repeats the above exercise but for high school graduates. Here, the modal age of
graduation is 18 years. For high school graduates, the IV results suggest that a 1
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percentage point increase in the unemployment rate at entry lowers the initial wage
by about 3 percent. The interaction term of potential experience with the national
unemployment rate at entry is positive and significant; the point estimate implies
that it takes 56 quarters or 14 years for wage gaps to close.
While it perhaps easy to rationalize why entering the job market during a recession
might cause severe initial wage losses, a more pressing issue concerns the recession’s
impact on future wage growth. One possible explanation for the existence of per-
sistent wage losses may be that individuals who enter the job market in a recession
suffer recurrent joblessness. Entering in a recession may cause individuals to be
unemployed for longer at the beginning of their working lives. The lack of initial
learning and job stability may in turn precipitate recurrent unemployment spells
as these individuals continually quit to search for jobs with the best match quality.
In this case, wages for individuals who enter during a recession may on average be
persistently lower, as these individuals are more likely to experience subsequent un-
employment spells and less human capital accumulation. Indeed, Pries (2004) shows
how unemployment rates may remain at an elevated level even after a recessionary
shock has died off because individuals suffer recurrent joblessness. To examine if
this is the main mechanism driving persistent wage losses, I replicate the empirical
exercise denoted in equation (1.1) but replace the dependent variable with the prob-
ability of being employed. Since wages can only be reported if one is employed, the
sample used for the wage regression is a subset of the sample used for the regression
on the probability of being employed.
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Table A.3 demonstrates the results from these regressions. Columns (1) and (2)
show the effect of the national unemployment rate at entry on the probability of
being employed from an OLS and IV regression respectively, while Columns (3) and
(4) show the analogous OLS and IV results using the regional unemployment rate.
Importantly, a 1 percentage point increase in either the national or regional unem-
ployment rate at entry causes no significant reduction in the probability of being
employed for college graduates. In fact, Kahn (2010) finds that a 1 percentage point
increase in the national unemployment rate at entry raises the probability of being
employed for college graduates by about 1 percent at the 10% significance level.
This suggests that the main source of persistent wage losses for college graduates
does not stem from a lower probability of being employed. This result is perhaps
not unsurprising. Intuitively, employers may be more selective in hiring during a
recession and may seek to hire individuals who have a better signal of productivity.
College individuals, in general, tend to fare better in terms of employment prospects
during a recession.
Table A.4 demonstrates the analogous results for high school graduates. The OLS
specifications in columns (1) and (3) show that a 1 percentage point increase in the
national or regional unemployment rate at the time of entry lowers the initial prob-
ability of being employed by close to 1 percentage point. However, this coefficient
is smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant in the IV specification. Un-
like the result for college graduates, the current unemployment rate is a significant
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factor for determining the probability of being employed for high school graduates.
Overall, these results show that high unemployment rates at entry do not exert per-
sistent effects on the employability of individuals, especially for college graduates.
These results suggest that persistent unemployment is likely not the main vehicle
driving persistent wage losses for college graduates.
While these exercises verify and highlight the existence of persistent wage scars from
entering in a recession, it remains unclear the channel through which these initial
conditions continue to affect wage outcomes. The rest of the analysis here focuses
on how job search strategies may be affected by initial conditions and how these
may play a role in fomenting persistent wage losses.
1.2.2 Definition of Job Changes
A key assertion of this paper is that persistent wage losses arise when individuals
enter the job market during recessions because of slow learning about comparative
advantage and because individuals accumulate irrelevant human capital. While both
current voluntary employment-to-employment (EE) transitions and unemployment-
to-employment (UE) transitions decline with the advent of a recession, this paper
posits that future employment-to-employment transitions are also affected when
individuals enter the job market during a recession. Throughout this paper, I focus
on quarterly transitions, although my results continue to hold at the monthly fre-
quency. An EE transition is recorded whenever an individual who was employed at
the start of the previous quarter is matched with a new employer at the start of the
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next quarter. Similarly, a UE (EU) transition is recorded when an individual who
was unemployed (employed) at the start of the previous quarter becomes employed
(unemployed) at the start of the next quarter. A UE (EU) transition probability
is therefore defined as the proportion of unemployed (employed) individuals at the
start of period t − 1 who became employed (unemployed) at the beginning of pe-
riod t. Table A.5 records the average transition probabilities for the samples of
college and high school graduates in the NLSY79 over the period 1979 to 2006. On
average, the rate at which employed college graduates move from one employer to
another is about 5.5% per quarter, while high school graduates move from employer
to employer at a rate of 6% per quarter. The rate at which the unemployed find
jobs (UE rate) is about 53% per quarter for college graduates, while about 32% of
unemployed high school graduates manage to find jobs each quarter. About 5% of
employed college and high school graduates enter into unemployment each quarter.
These rates are comparable to numbers found by Shimer (2012) and Fallick and
Fleischmann (2004) (henceforth referred to as FF(2004)) for the whole labor force.7
Since this paper is primarily concerned with individuals’ voluntary job changes mo-
tivated by the desire to find a career that suits their comparative advantage, I focus
on EE transitions. Limiting the focus to EE transitions helps to reduce the number
of involuntary job changes in the sample. An individual who is displaced from his
current job during a recession may be forced to undertake another job which uses
7 Note that the quarterly equivalents for the monthly transitions rates recorded for FF(2004)
are calculated as rquarter = 1− (1− rmonth)3.
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completely different tasks and human capital. However, it is clear that under such
a scenario the individual did not switch jobs voluntarily in an attempt to find his
comparative advantage but was rather forced to take a new job because of reasons
unrelated to learning.
In addition, I focus on between-job transitions rather than within-job transitions.
A between-job transition is observed whenever there is a change of employer. A
within-job transition is observed whenever the individual undergoes a change in
occupation code but no change in employer. An individual’s work activities at a
firm may change as he climbs up the internal labor market ladder; these within-job
transitions, however, are not regarded as career changes in the model, as they do
not necessarily reflect an individual’s effort at job experimentation in order to learn
his comparative advantage. Rather, these within-job transitions reflect positional
changes at the same firm. In focusing on between-job changes, I control for the
fact that individuals may take into account the career progression or promotion
prospects at a particular job. For example, an individual may choose to work as
a sales representative at a firm, knowing that he may later observe a within-job
transition to become a sales manager. In this case, such a transition would resemble
a career progression rather than a switch in careers. In general, I treat within-job
transitions as within-career progressions, as it likely that the human capital gained
at a lower position in a particular job is still transferable even as the individual moves
up the internal labor market ladder at that job. Continuing the earlier example,
an individual who was initially a sales representative is likely able to transfer his
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accumulated human capital when he becomes sales manager at a firm. Thus, in the
following, I focus on how EE transitions between jobs behave over the life cycle and
the business cycle.
1.2.3 Defining Simple and Complex Job Changes
Previous literature such as Neal (1999) and Gervais et al (2010) suggests that in-
dividuals tend to search for a career in the early stages of their working life while
they tend to search for an employer or for match quality in the latter stages of their
working life. While Gervais et al (2010) focus on how occupational learning causes
unemployment rates to change over the life cycle, I focus on the type of job search
the individual undertakes over his working life and how this changes with the busi-
ness cycle. To distinguish between the types of job search, I follow the framework
given in Pavan (2011) and Neal (1999). Using three-digit Census occupation and
industry codes, an individual is defined to have undergone a between-career change
if changes are recorded in all of the following three dimensions: 1) industry code, 2)
occupation code and 3) employer. Recall that a between-job change only requires a
change in employer. Hence, it is important to note that not all between-job changes
are between-career changes.
An individual is assumed to be changing jobs within the same career if he only
undergoes either one or two of the above three mentioned changes. A within-career
job change is recorded whenever the individual 1) changes employers and observes
no change in either occupation or industry code, or 2) changes employers and ob-
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serves either a change in occupation or industry, but not both. Any within-career
job change or between-career job change must observe an employer change. This
condition avoids mis-coding promotions at jobs as either a within-career or between-
career job change. Having controlled for promotions, I assume that between-career
changes reflect an individual’s search for a career that fits his comparative advan-
tage, while within-career changes reflect the individual’s search for a better match
quality in terms of employer. Following the convention established in Neal(1999),
I will henceforth use the term ‘complex change’ when referring to a between-career
job change and the term ‘simple change’ when referring to a within-career job change.
A problem that arises in the data is that many of the job changes recorded in the
NLSY79 are actually cycles between two values, from occupation 1 to occupation 2
and then back to occupation 1. These cycles could be due to mis-coding within the
dataset. Following Pavan(2011) and Neal(1999), I infer that a complex job change
has occurred if 1) the employer in period t is different from the employer in period
t− 1 and the same as in period t+ 1, and 2) the industry and occupation codes in
period t − 1 are different from the occupation and industry codes in period t and
t+1. In the same vein, a simple job change is coded if 1) the employer in period t is
different from the employer in period t−1 and the same as in period t+1, and there
is no observed change in either occupation and industry codes, or 2) the employer
in period t is different from the employer in period t− 1 and the same as in period
t + 1, and either the industry or occupation codes (but not both) in period t − 1
are different from the occupation and industry codes in period t and t + 1. These
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definitions help to reduce any mis-coding of job changes.
A key concern is whether these definitions accurately depict between and within
career changes. As a quick check, I use the Dictionary of Occupational Titles to
check if a complex (simple) job change entails a more significant (less significant)
change in the tasks required to work in that job. In the appendix, I explain in detail
how I construct a measure of task distance using information from the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles. A higher task distance for an observed job change is associated
with less transferability of human capital between jobs. In general, I find that about
85 per cent of simple job changes observed in my sample have a task distance below
the mean task distance observed for all job changes. In contrast, 45 per cent of
complex job changes in my sample have a task distance above the mean task dis-
tance. These findings suggest that complex job changes are more strongly associated
with non-transferability of specific human capital, while simple job changes seem to
preserve human capital accumulated and are less likely to represent between-career
changes.
1.2.4 Job Search Strategies over the Life Cycle and Business Cycle
Central to this paper’s focus is how job search strategies vary with both the life
cycle and business cycle. To capture the variation over the life-cycle, Figure A.1
plots the probabilities of complex and simple EE transitions exhibited by each age
group of white male college graduates in the labor force, while Figure A.2 plots the
same variation for high school graduates. Dashed lines represent 90% confidence
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bands. Notably, individuals engage in more complex job-to-job transitions early on
in their working life, reinforcing the notion that individuals initially search for a ca-
reer. On average, about 3.2% of employed college graduates and 3.9% of employed
high school graduates undergo a complex change each quarter. However, the rate
of complex job changes declines sharply with age. In contrast, simple job-to-job
transitions decline more slowly with age and only exhibit a significant downward
decline from age 40 onwards. Hence, I find evidence supportive of the two stage
job-search strategy suggested by Neal (1999). The accumulation of career-specific
human capital is a leading candidate explanation for the sharp decay in the num-
ber of complex job changes over age. Pavan (2011) documents that career-specific
tenure contributes to an important part of wage growth; ten years of career-specific
human capital raises log wages by 0.2 points. As such, complex job changes should
optimally decline as individuals age, as individuals would otherwise lose out on ac-
cumulating career-specific human capital essential to later wage growth.
A more interesting question is how these job search strategies may be affected by ini-
tial business cycle conditions. Given the life cycle behavior of voluntary job changes,
I examine how entering the job market during an expansionary or recessionary pe-
riod might affect the trajectory of these voluntary job changes. As the NLSY79
follows individuals born between the years of 1958 to 1965, the major recessions
faced at the time of entry for college graduates in my sample are the 1980s and
1990s recessions. For high school graduates, the major recessions captured at the
time of entry are the 1980s recessions. To overcome the limitations in time-series
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variation, I focus on both spatial and time variation in unemployment rates, using
data on both the national unemployment rate and unemployment rates across Cen-
sus regions. To define a recession, I follow the methodology of Hoynes et al. (2012)
and define a recession as the trough-to-peak points of the seasonally adjusted un-
employment rate. Figure A.3 highlights that the cyclical adjustment of the national
unemployment rate tends to lag NBER recession dates, shown in the figure using
shaded bars. In general, labor market recoveries tend to lag the recovery in GDP
growth. As high search frictions are posited as the main reason why slow learning
and an accumulation of irrelevant human capital may occur for workers entering the
job market during a recession, my preferred indicator of business cycle turning points
is the unemployment rate, as this best proxies for the level of search frictions in the
economy. Hence, for the following analyses, the words ‘expansion’ and ‘recession’
will be used to refer loosely to periods marking peak-to-trough and trough-to-peak
movement in unemployment respectively.
I conduct two exercises to examine how job search strategies may be affected by
initial business cycle conditions. Firstly, I examine the duration before an individual
undertakes his first complex (simple) job change. Intuitively, I expect that if search
frictions are high, both unemployed and employed workers would face reduced job
mobility. Hence, recessions should slow the learning process for individuals and
delay their switching into alternative careers or jobs. Secondly, I examine how
future mobility in terms of both complex and simple job changes is affected by
initial job conditions. This second exercise aims to verify if there is any evidence of
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a ‘lock-in’ effect. An individual who was initially unable to switch jobs may observe
reduced future job mobility especially in terms of complex job changes, as it is costly
to switch careers and discard accumulated career-specific human capital.
1.2.5 Results on Initial Job Mobility
In the following figures, individuals in the sample were divided into two groups, 1)
individuals who entered the job market in a recession vs. 2) those who entered in
an expansion. Recall that a recession is defined as the trough-to-peak periods of
the unemployment rate. Unless otherwise mentioned, all analyses are conducted at
a quarterly frequency. Figure A.4 plots the Kaplan - Meier estimate of the survivor
function and outlines the probability that a college graduate remains in the same
career since his initial entry into the labor market. Dotted lines refer to 90% con-
fidence intervals. Figure A.4 is indicative of the duration before a college graduate
undertakes his first complex job change. Notably, individuals who entered the labor
market during a recession experience a lower hazard rate and are less likely to con-
duct a complex job change. This delay in early career changes holds even when the
analysis is restricted to individuals who managed to find a job and were employed
within the first quarter of entry into the job market, as shown in Figure A.5 which
plots the survival probability conditional on being employed. These results continue
to apply at a higher frequency of job-to-job transitions. Figure A.6 uses monthly
data and again shows that individuals entering during a recession have a lower prob-
ability of conducting a complex job change. Figure A.7 plots the analog to Figure
A.4 but for high school graduates. The solid line highlights the survivor function for
27
individuals who joined the job market during an expansion, while the dashed line
highlights the survivor function for individuals who joined the job market during
a recession. A comparison of Figure A.4 and Figure A.7 suggests that high school
graduates entering during a recession face an even sharper reduction in their ability
to switch careers than college graduates. This is consistent with the notion that the
1980s recession was largely a “blue collar recession”.
In contrast, Figure A.8 plots the analogous survivor function for simple job changes
and shows the probability that a college graduate has not experienced any simple
job change since his initial entry into the labor market. Unlike complex job changes,
recessions do not seem to significantly affect the timing of college graduates’ first
simple job change. Intuitively, this may be because individuals tend to concentrate
on complex job changes early in their working career. Hence, initial conditions
are likely to affect only the first complex job change rather than the first simple job
change that the individual is able to undertake. Figure A.9 shows the corresponding
plot for high school graduates. Unlike the result for college graduates, high school
graduates who enter during a recession are more likely to observe a delay in their
first simple job change, although this difference is small in magnitude. This in part
may be due to the fact that high school graduates are more likely to be unemployed
during a recession. Recall from Table (A.4) that the current unemployment rate
exerts a negative effect on high school graduates’ probability of being employed.
High school graduates who enter during a recession are less likely to be employed
and hence may suffer a set-back in terms of overall human capital accumulation.
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This lack of human capital accumulation, in turn, affects a high school graduate’s
future job-finding probabilities within a career as experience adds to an individual’s
effective labor input. Consequently, even the first simple job change for a high school
graduate may be delayed if he enters the labor market during a recession. Notably,
Adda et al (2013) argue that the loss in earnings for less-skilled workers who enter
during a recession stems largely from low human capital accumulation on the job
while the loss in earnings for high-skilled workers stems from a loss of job mobility
or search capital.
To investigate whether these differences are sensitive to my definition of a “re-
cession”, I estimate a proportional hazards duration model including the national
unemployment rate faced at the time of entry, controlling for other individual char-
acteristics such as potential experience, potential experience squared, the AFQT
score, the current national unemployment rate and regional dummies. The duration
model assumes the standardized Weibull distribution. Table A.6 presents the results
from these regressions. Column 1 presents the results of the proportional hazards
model of the probability of having no complex job change for college graduates,
while Column 3 presents the analogous results for high school graduates. The esti-
mated coefficients are from a regression on the log of the hazard function. Negative
coefficients imply lower hazard rates and correspondingly longer durations. Taking
the exponent of the regression coefficients, a one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate at entry multiplies the baseline hazard rate of a complex job
change for college graduates by a factor of 0.93, or equivalently lowers the hazard
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rate by 7%. Similarly, a 1 percentage point increase in the initial unemployment
rate faced at entry lowers the hazard rate by about 9 percent for high school gradu-
ates. These effects are both significant at the 10% level. Columns 2 and 4 of Table
A.6 demonstrate that the initial unemployment rate has no significant impact on the
duration before the first simple job change for either college or high school graduates.
One problem with these estimated survival functions is that actual entry into the
labor market is endogenous. There may be unobserved systematic differences be-
tween individuals who choose to enter during a recession and those who choose to
enter during an expansion. To control for potential selection effects, I follow Kahn
(2010) and instrument the actual unemployment rate at date of entry with the un-
employment rate at the modal age of entry. To do this, I first construct a mobility
indicator which takes the value of 1 if the individual undergoes a complex (simple)
job change in a particular period and zero otherwise.8 I then estimate the following
regression:
Mobcit = γ0 + γ1u0,i + γ2u0,i ∗ Pot.Expit + ζXit + νist (1.4)
where Mobcit is the mobility indicator for individual i in period t and the super-
script c refers to either a Complex or Simple job change. Independent variables are
the same as in equation (1.1). Table A.7 reports thee results for the probability
of conducting a complex job change for college graduates while Table A.8 presents
analogous results for simple job changes. For both tables, Columns 1 and 2 show
8 Note that because complex job changes can only be calculated for those who are employed,
the sample used here is the same as the sample used for the wage regressions.
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OLS and IV results using the initial national unemployment rate while Columns 3
and 4 present analogous results using the initial regional unemployment rate Stan-
dard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by birth year cohort.
Notably, Tables A.7 and A.8 show that increases in potential experience exert sig-
nificant downward pressure on the probability of a complex job change but have
relatively little effect on simple job changes. This is line with the idea that complex
job changes involve a loss of career-specific human capital whereas human capital is
typically transferable between simple job changes.
From the IV regressions, a one percentage point increase in the initial national un-
employment rate lowers the initial probability of a complex job change by 1.35 per-
centage points for a new college graduate. Given that on average, 3.2% of employed
individuals conduct a complex job-to-job transition every quarter, this suggests that
a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate reduces the initial com-
plex employment-to-employment transition probability by about a third. Moreover,
this effect seems to persist for some years after entry into the job market. The
estimated coefficient on the interaction term, uit ∗ Pot.Expit, suggests that it takes
about 50 quarters or 12 years before the gap in complex job-to-job transition prob-
abilities disappears. Importantly, the first 12 years of an individual’s working life
form precisely the period when individuals concentrate on finding the right career.
In contrast, Columns 1 and 2 of Table A.8 indicate that initial labor market con-
ditions exert little or no impact on the probability of undertaking simple job changes.
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Similar findings are obtained using regional unemployment rates. Column 4 of Ta-
ble A.7 indicates that a one percentage point increase in the regional unemployment
rate at the time of entry lowers the initial probability of a complex job-to-job tran-
sition by about 0.54 percentage points, implying that the probability of conducting
a complex change is reduced by about 15 percent when an individual enters the
job market during a recession. Interestingly, these results suggest that the national
unemployment rate at entry exerts a stronger adverse effect on the probability of a
complex job change than the local unemployment rate. Recent work by Wozniak
(2010) and Cadena and Kovak (2013) suggests that higher-skilled individuals and
college graduates are more affected by changing national labor market conditions
than lower skilled workers and high school graduates, and are more likely to move to
markets with better job opportunities. The more muted impact of the initial regional
unemployment rate may arise as a result of college graduates selecting or migrating
into local labor markets with better opportunities. In contrast, a more depressed
national labor market at entry suggests weak job-finding opportunities overall and
hence fewer avenues for college graduates to conduct complex job changes.
Tables A.9 and A.10 present results for high school graduates. Results for complex
job changes are qualitatively similar but are smaller in magnitude. About 3.9%
of employed high school graduates conduct a complex job-to-job transition every
quarter. The IV results in column 2 of Table A.9 suggest that a 1 percentage point
increase in the initial national unemployment rate reduces the probability of a com-
plex job change by about 0.1 percentage points, while a 1 percentage point increase
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in the initial regional unemployment rate reduces the probability of a complex job
change by about 0.2 percentage points. Notably, for high school graduates, the
national unemployment rate at entry does not exert a more adverse effect on the
probability of a complex job-to-job transition rate relative to the initial regional un-
employment rate, in line with previous literature showing that lower skilled workers
and high school graduates are more affected by local labor market conditions and
are less likely to migrate for better job opportunities. Simple job changes are also
adversely affected by an increase in the initial unemployment rate for high school
graduates, albeit to a smaller extent than complex changes. A 1 percentage point
increase in the national (regional) unemployment rate at entry lowers the probabil-
ity of a simple job change by about 0.07 (0.1) percentage points.
Overall, college graduates who enter in a weak labor market are less likely to conduct
a between-career change not just in the initial years but for a substantial portion
of their working life. On average, it takes about 50 quarters or 12 years before
the negative effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate at
entry on the probability of conducting a complex job change completely wears off.
High school graduates, on the other hand, are less likely to conduct both complex
and simple job changes over their working life if they enter during a recession. In
general, these results suggest that the initial unemployment rate exerts a significant
and persistent impact on career mobility, especially for college graduates. Given that
early job switching is associated with significant increases in wages, this suggests that
early lost opportunities to find the right career can affect future wage outcomes. To
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rationalize these findings, I now construct a model that outlines how initial business
cycle conditions can affect complex (between-career) job changes and show how
these effects on job search strategies may factor into wage outcomes.
1.3 Model
To examine how initial conditions, learning and specific human capital can inter-
act to affect long-term wage outcomes, this paper builds upon the directed search
framework of Menzio and Shi (2010), and the extension of that model with human
capital accumulation outlined in Menzio et al. (2012). Specifically I incorporate two
new features into the model. First, I embed a learning problem into the standard
Menzio and Shi(2010) directed search framework. Individuals are ex-ante heteroge-
neous and have differing aptitudes at different careers. As individuals have imperfect
knowledge about their comparative advantage and do not know which career max-
imizes their type, they must work at different careers to learn about their set of
aptitudes. Individuals, upon observing output, update priors about their compara-
tive advantage and direct their search according to their perceived type and known
characteristics rather than just their previous wage offer.
Secondly, I allow for multi-dimensional aptitudes and introduce specific human cap-
ital into the set-up of Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers (2012). The latter paper
assumes that workers only possess general human capital. In my model, workers
gain experience through on-the-job learning-by-doing. However, experience accu-
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mulated is specific to the career workers are employed in. Finally, my model also
deviates from the standard Menzio and Shi (2010) directed search framework, in
which firms post lifetime expected utility contracts, by assuming that firms post
spot wage contracts. As agents in my model learn about their aptitudes through
working at a job, downward revisions in perceived capabilities are possible. Spot
wage contracts prevent a firm from being locked-into an unsavory contract with a
worker who is later discovered to be a “lemon” at that particular career. Alter-
natively, one could introduce a state-contingent contract where wages evolve with
the perceived and known characteristics of the worker. Since such long-term state-
contingent contracts would need to take into account the possible evolution of the
worker’s type, this paper assumes spot wage contracts for computational simplicity.
Given these features, I build a general equilibrium model to consider how learning
and accumulation of human capital, and consequently wage growth, are affected by
the initial state of the business cycle. The notation throughout this paper observes
the following conventions: all current period (time t) objects are listed as x, while
all next period objects are denoted with a prime, x′. All forecast terms are denoted
with a hat, x̂, and all terms that are signals are denoted with a tilde, x̃. The





Time is discrete and continues forever. In a single cohort, there is a unit measure
of individuals who live for T periods. In every period, there is a new generation of
workers born into the economy such that there are always T overlapping generations
in the economy. There is no savings in the economy and workers consume all of their
wage income. There are K varieties of goods in the market that individuals can






where C is taken to be an aggregate consumption good and ck is the amount of






where τ refers to the age of the individual.
Since workers get equal utility from consuming the same amount of any ck for
k ∈ [1, K], individuals seek to maximize the expected present discounted value of
their wage outcomes in order to maximize their expected lifetime utility. Thus, we
can represent the individual’s preferences each period in terms of an indirect utility




Workers are ex-ante heterogeneous and are each endowed with different aptitudes
at K varieties of tasks, where K ≥ 2. Denote µi as the time-invariant vector that
characterizes worker i’s aptitude at learning different tasks. Specifically, µi is a
K × 1 vector with µi = [µi1, µi2, . . . , µiK ]′. µi is log-normally distributed with mean
µ̄K×1 and variance Σµ = IK×K × σ2µ.
I assume that each job in sector k uses task k to produce variety k. Thus, each
career is a single-task job. Individuals entering the job market for the first time
have imperfect information about their aptitudes at different tasks. A worker learns
about his aptitude at a particular task by working at a job that uses that task for
production. The current job, however, does not reveal the worker’s aptitude at other
jobs that utilize different tasks. As such, searching and working only at jobs within
one sector does not reveal a worker’s aptitude at jobs in other sectors.9
Individuals also learn on the job and accumulate task-specific experience. Human
capital at a task k, hik, is a product of both the individual’s innate aptitude and his
9 This assumption can be relaxed in future versions of the model. One can assume that jobs
are multi-dimensional and use more than one task for production. Workers then learn about their
aptitudes at many tasks from one job. The rate of learning would be pegged to the intensity with
which that task is used for production. This would induce a trade-off between learning about
more aptitudes against lower experience gained at each task. Alternatively, one can model a job as
having varying informational content. Antonovics and Golan(2012) construct a model of life-cycle
job mobility and show that agents would initially engage in job experimentation and take initial
wage cuts to work in jobs that provide more informational content.
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level of experience in that task:
hik = µikyik (1.6)
where µik refers to the innate and unknown aptitude that an individual i has at task
k, while yik refers to the amount of experience individual i has accumulated at task
k. Labor market experience at a task evolves in the following manner:
y′ik =

yik + ζ if worked at task k today
yik else
where ζ denotes the additional experience gained by working at a particular task.
If a worker doesn’t use a particular task in his current sector then he gains no ex-
perience in that particular task this period.
Workers and firms can perfectly observe the total amount of experience a worker
has accumulated working at a particular task, yik. It is imperfect information on an
individual’s innate aptitude, µik, that causes workers and firms to have imperfect
information on workers’ human capital.
Production Technology
The economy has K ‘sectors’; each ‘sector’ is defined by the task it uses for produc-
tion, implying an equal number of tasks as sectors. Equivalently, a sector in this
38
model is the same as a career since each task is tied to one career. There always
exists an infinite number of idle firms in each sector. However, not all existing firms
operate in the economy at the same time. In every period, an “unrestricted” mass
of firms optimally chooses to enter or exit the market. Given free entry, the zero
profit condition determines the number of firms in operation in each sector at any
period in time. Each job consists of a single firm-worker pair. When a firm separates
from a worker, it leaves the labor market and shuts down. Firms that shut down
are replaced automatically by new idle firms in the market.
All firms that operate in a sector k possess the same production technology, but are
subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks in addition to an aggregate productivity
shock. A firm j that chooses to operate and that is matched with a worker i in sector




where qijk refers to the output of a firm-worker pair {j, i} at task k.10 hik refers to
individual i’s human capital at task k. Each firm j that is currently in operation
in the market is faced with an i.i.d idiosyncratic productivity shock, aj, which is
drawn from a lognormal distribution with mean ā and variance σa. I assume that
firms do not know their true idiosyncratic productivity, aj, although they do know
the distribution it is drawn from. Because idiosyncratic productivity is i.i.d., there
10 Note that since each sector is defined by the task firms use for production, k corresponds to
both the sector and the task.
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is no scope for firms to learn about their idiosyncratic productivity next period.
Finally, production is subject to an aggregate shock z that uniformly affects output
at all tasks. z lies in the set Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zN}, where N is a positive integer,
and z follows a Markov process. At the beginning of each period, nature draws the
aggregate productivity, z, from the probability distribution Φ(z|z−1). All firms and
workers are able to observe z at the start of each period.
Firms and workers observe {qijk, z, yik, τ} while they have imperfect information
on {µik, aj}. Firms and workers also know ζ and hence can observe the amount
of relevant experience workers will have for the next period, y′ik. Upon observing
output, firms and workers update and form new priors of workers’ type, µ̂′i. Firms
and workers also update Σµi,τ , the variance co-variance matrix of their posterior
beliefs. Σµi,τ evolves deterministically as a worker accumulates experience and is
strictly non-increasing over time. As aj is an i.i.d. shock, output today provides no
information about idiosyncratic shocks tomorrow.
Both firms and workers form beliefs about µi in order to form their recruitment and
job search decisions. As output is a noisy signal, firms and workers face a signal
extraction problem when trying to learn about a worker’s type. Information, while
imperfect, is symmetric between firms and workers.
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Labor Market
Idle firms in a sector k become recruiting firms when they choose to post a vacancy.
As each job consists of a single firm-worker pair, currently matched firms do not
post new vacancies. Recruiting firms post spot market wage contracts when creating
a vacancy. At the same time, matched firms in each period make new take-it-or-
leave-it wage-share offers based on updated guesses of their worker’s type. While
recruiting firms incur a vacancy posting cost whenever they create a vacancy and
post a wage offer, matched firms do not incur any vacancy posting cost as they are
merely offering new wage shares to workers they are currently matched with. In
addition, search is costless for workers.
Each sector k is defined by a continuum of submarkets indexed by the tuplet
(xk, µk, yk, τ), where τ refers to the age of the worker, xk is the share of output
a firm promises its worker, and µk and yk are the current levels of perceived in-
nate aptitude and experience that a firm requires of a worker respectively.11 Notice
that beyond specifying the wage share offer, firms are also able to condition on the
current perceived value of aptitude and on current experience when posting a job.
Importantly, the amount of career-specific experience affects both the worker’s level
11 While it may seem odd that firms can condition so precisely on a worker’s type, this version
of the model allows for this assumption for tractability reasons, as submarkets are continuous and
information is symmetric. This assumption can be relaxed by assuming that information is still
symmetric but there exists regulation that allows firms to only specify requirements in “blocks”.
In this case, firms specify minimum requirements or alternatively, trait sets. In addition, it is not
uncommon in the search literature for firms to condition on experience, age and ability. Relevant
examples include Burdett et al. (2011) who allow contracts to depend on applicants’ skill and
experience (but not their employment state), and Menzio, Telyukova, and Visschers (2012) who
allow firms to write contracts that depend on age and experience.
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of human capital and the precision of beliefs about the worker’s aptitude at that
career. When an individual works at a task, he not only gains career-specific expe-
rience but learns about his aptitude at that career. More experienced workers have
more certainty over their aptitude at that career. Posting experience requirements
implies that firms are also inherently choosing the level of precision they desire in
beliefs about a worker’s aptitude.
Submarkets differ in the terms of trade offered by firms; a submarket (xk, µk, yk, τ)
consists of firms offering wage share xk to a worker of age τ with experience yk
and perceived innate aptitude µk. This implies that θ, the labor market tightness
condition in each submarket within a sector, is a function of (xk,µk,yk,τ). The labor
tightness condition θ - defined as the ratio of vacancies to the number of applicants -
is also affected by the aggregate state of the economy given by {z, ϕ}, where ϕ refers
to the aggregate distribution of workers in the economy. As shown by Menzio and
Shi (2010), under a block-recursive equilibrium, the labor tightness condition will
depend on the aggregate economy only through the value of aggregate productivity
z, as will be elaborated further below.
Job-finding and job-filling probabilities depend on the labor tightness condition. The
probability of finding a job p(θ) is assumed twice-differentiable, strictly increasing
and concave in θ with boundary conditions p(0) = 0 and p(∞) = 1. A firm fills a
job with probability f(θ) = p(θ)
θ
, where f(θ) is strictly decreasing in θ, f(0) = 1 and
f(∞) = 0. When a firm and a worker meet in sub-market (xk, µk, yk, τ), a worker
42
without the pre-requisite requirements, i.e. a worker whose perceived aptitude, ex-
perience and age are not equal to (µk, yk, τ), is automatically rejected. A worker
who meets the criteria of a job and chooses to accept the offer begins production
within the same period.
At the beginning of every period, the aggregate distribution of workers can be sum-
marized by the tuple ϕ = (n, u, e). The first element of ϕ is a function n : N→ R+
where n represents the measure of individuals that are entering the labor market for
the first time. The second element of ϕ is a function u : N3 → R+ where u(µk, yk, τ)
is the measure of unemployed people of age τ who have perceived aptitude µ̂k = µk
and experience yk in a particular sector k. Thus, u(µk, yk, τ) refers only to the unem-
ployed searching in a particular sector k in a sub-market which requires {µk, yk, τ}
characteristics of a worker. The last element of ϕ is a function e : N3 → R+,
where e(µk, yk, τ) refers to the measure of employed people of age τ who have per-
ceived aptitude µk and experience yk. Hence for each submarket, we can calculate
and distinguish the number of unemployed and employed who apply to that market.
Since a sector is defined by a task or skill that it uses for production, implicitly
one can think of job-to-job transitions across sectors as complex job changes, while
a job-to-job transition within the same sector but to a different sub-market can
be represented as a simple job change. Notably, experience, yk, is not transferable
across sectors but is transferable within a sector across different submarkets.
43
1.3.2 Timing
Each period is divided into five sub-stages: 1) entry, 2) separation, 3) search and
matching, 4) production and finally 5) learning.
At the end of the last period, firms and workers observe the posterior belief on the
worker’s vector of aptitudes. Hence, both firms and workers start each new period
with the updated guess of the worker’s comparative advantage. At the beginning of
a period, both firms and workers also observe the new draw of aggregate productivity
z. Upon observing z and the updated guess on the worker’s type, currently matched
firms make a new ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ wage share offer, ω. Denote s = {µ̂i, yi, z}.
Hence, currently employed workers begin the period with {s, ω}.
In the first sub-stage (Entry), an unmatched firm must decide whether to post a
vacancy given its observation of aggregate productivity today, z. If a firm decides to
post a vacancy, it incurs a vacancy posting cost of κ. In addition, a firm j in sector
k that chooses to recruit a worker has to decide which submarket, (xk, µk, yk, τ), to
post a vacancy in. While all firms like workers to possess high innate aptitude and
experience, posting a high requirement of µk or yk reduces the probability of finding
a worker. Similarly, firms would prefer to post a low wage share offer to workers
as this increases their profits. However, a low wage share offer lowers the firm’s
hiring probability. In the same vein, firms prefer workers who have high precision
on their type, as this reduces the uncertainty with regards to the firm’s profits. Al-
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though firms are risk-neutral, the precision of a worker’s beliefs matters for a firm’s
expected lifetime profits. A worker who has a more precise belief that he has high
aptitude in the sector he is searching in brings higher expected discounted profits to
the firm, as he has a lower likelihood of leaving the firm for a job in another sector.
Intuitively, workers base their career search decisions on the expected life-time wage
earnings they can derive from working in a particular sector. Young workers with
poor precision in their beliefs are more liable to switch careers as they learn about
their type. Low retention probabilities of such workers imply lower streams of profit
to a firm. Nevertheless, while firms like workers with more precise beliefs, higher
requirements on a worker’s experience (which is a proxy for precision) also reduce
the firm’s hiring probability.
Thus, the firm’s hiring probability, f(θ(xk, µk, yk, τ, z, ϕ)), is increasing in xk, the
wage share offer to workers, and decreasing in µk and yk. As all recruiting firms
are ex-ante homogeneous, the trade-off in hiring probabilities and expected profit
makes them indifferent in posting to any market.12.
In the second sub-stage (Separation), a firm that is already matched with a worker
is exogenously destroyed with probability δ. In addition, given their beliefs as sum-
marized by s and their new wage share offer ω, employed workers voluntarily part
with firms if the value of being unemployed is higher than the value of staying with
12 This claim is no longer true if idiosyncratic productivity is persistent. In that case, there would
be sorting by both firms and workers. However, functional forms and parameters would determine
whether positive sorting results.
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the firm. Hence, a firm separates from its worker with probability d(ω) ∈ {δ, 1}.
In the third sub-stage (Search and Matching), a worker (either unemployed or em-
ployed) chooses which submarket, (xk, µk, yk, τ), to search for a job based on his
beliefs about his type and aggregate TFP. Individuals who are unemployed at the
beginning of the period (before the first sub-stage) have the opportunity to search
the labor market for jobs in each period with probability λu = 1. Individuals who
were employed at the beginning of the period and who were not separated from
their jobs in the second sub-stage have the opportunity to search the market for
alternative jobs with probability λe ≤ 1 . Individuals who were employed at the
beginning of the period but were separated in the second sub-stage cannot search
immediately but must wait until the next period to look for a job. This follows the
convention of Menzio and Shi (2010).
When a vacancy and a worker meet in submarket {xk, µk, yk, τ}, the firm always
rejects any worker whose age, experience and perceived innate aptitude differ from
the specified levels {µk, yk, τ}. Thus, the firm’s posting of {µk, yk, τ} constrains the
types of workers that can qualify for the job. As such, an individual that does not
meet the posted requirements will never search for a job in that sub-market as his
probability of getting the job will be zero. Effectively, this implies that within a sec-
tor, an individual only has choice over his desired wage share xk. Given his perceived
aptitudes and experience, the worker conducts a two-stage job search strategy. The
worker first optimizes which sub-market to visit in each sector, and then chooses
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which sector to search for a job. A worker finds a job in sector k in submarket
{xk, µk, yk, τ} with probability p(θ(xk, µk, yk, τ, z, ϕ)). In equilibrium, workers al-
ways accept a job when they meet a firm since they have already optimized which
market to search for a job.
In the fourth sub-stage (Production), matched firm-worker pairs produce output
according to equation (1.7).
Finally, in the last sub-stage (Learning), matched firm-worker pairs observe their
output at each task. Matched firms and workers update their guess on the matched
worker’s aptitude at a job by using the information from their own private output
and knowledge of z. I assume that individuals solve a Kalman Filtering problem to
update their guess on their type.
At the end of the period, matched workers consume the promised share, ω, of output
and matched firms receive (1−ω) share of output as profits. Unemployed individuals
receive benefit b, which for simplicity can be assumed to be financed by a lump sum
tax that is levied on all individuals.
1.3.3 Value Functions
As aforementioned, I use s = (µ̂i, yi, τ, z) to denote an individual’s perception about
his aptitude, experience,age and aggregate productivity today. Since production
occurs after separation and search, individuals at the beginning of a period do not
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know for certain the amount of income they will receive in the current period.
Instead, individuals form expectations over the likely income they will receive in
both current and future periods.
Unemployed Worker
At the start of a period, an unemployed worker, given s, must solve the following
discrete choice problem:






θ(xk, µk, yk, τ, z, ϕ)
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where Ru∗k (s) represents the optimized value from the search problem for each sector
k and b is the unemployment compensation the worker receives if he is unemployed
at the end of the period.
As aforementioned, unemployed workers must solve a two-stage optimization prob-
lem. In the first stage, an unemployed worker chooses which sub-market to search
within a sector. Because a firm’s vacancy posting in a sub-market specifies the
requirements a worker must have in order to apply for that job, i.e. (µk, yk, τ), a
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worker effectively only chooses xk in deciding which sub-market to search. From
equation (1.9), an unemployed individual maximizes his search problem in a sector
k by choosing the optimal wage share xk from the menu of contracts posted. The
first line in equation (1.9) describes the expected return from finding a job in a
particular sub-market; p(θ(xk, µk, yk, τ, z, ϕ)) is the probability that a worker finds
a job in sub-market (xk, µk, yk, τ), while the second term refers to the expected cur-
rent and continuation utility an individual would receive if he finds a job in that
sub-market. The second line in equation (1.9) denotes the individual’s expected cur-
rent and continuation utility if he fails to find a job in that particular sub-market.
The policy function associated with equation (1.9) is xuk = argmax
xk
Ruk(s), which is
implicitly given by equation (1.10):
px(θτ )
[





+ p(θ)Eqijk = 0 (1.10)
where px(θ) refers to the first derivative of p(θ(xk, µk, yk, τz, ϕ)) with respect to xk
and p(θ) refers to p(θ(xk, µk, yk, τ, z, ϕ)). Recall that px is negative, as higher post-
ings of xk erode a firm’s take-home profit for that period and as such decrease the
job-finding rate of the worker. The first term in equation (1.10) therefore refers to
the expected marginal cost of seeking a job that offers a higher wage share. The
second term in equation (1.10) refers to the expected marginal benefit of seeking a
job that offers a higher wage share. As firms get to ‘reset’ their wage share offers
every period, the optimal choice of xk affects only current period wage outcomes.
From equation (1.10), the optimal targeted wage share, xuk , is a function of both the
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individual’s outside option as well as his own characteristics, including the amount
of human capital he has in that sector.
Having solved this first-stage optimization problem, the unemployed individual then
chooses which sector k would provide him the greatest benefit from search. This
choice is given by equation (1.8). Because search is costless, unemployed workers
search for a job in every period.
Employed Workers
Employed workers enter the period with updated beliefs on their aptitude µi, observe
z and receive new wage share offers ω from their current employers. Hence, each
employed worker starts the period prior to vacancy posting with (ω, s). Workers
who are currently employed in sector l solve the following discrete choice problem:
V (ω, s) = max{Re∗1 (ω, s), Re∗2 (ω, s), . . . , Re∗K (ω, s)} (1.11)
where
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l ∈ {1, . . . , K}, k ∈ {1, . . . , K}
Re∗k (ω, s) for k ≥ 1 represents the value from the optimized search problem for each
sector. Equation (1.12) highlights the search problem of an employed worker cur-
rently in sector l. Note that xk is represents the potential wage offer from recruiting
firms while ω represents the wage offer from the current firm. Similarly, ω′ is the
wage offer from the current firm for next period, while x′k is the wage offer from
the recruiting firm next period. Exkqijk in equation (1.12) refers to the expected
current wage the worker receives if he finds a new job in the sector k while Eωqijl
refers to the expected wage the worker receives if he remains in his current job in
sector l. Note that l can be equal to k if the worker chooses to search within the
same sector for his next job.
Similar to their unemployed counterparts, employed individuals solve a two-stage op-
timization problem. Employed individuals first choose which sub-market to search
within a sector before deciding which sector provides them the maximal benefit
from search. The employed worker’s problem differs from the unemployed individ-
ual’s problem in two key areas: 1) The employed individual faces some probability
of being separated from his current job, d(ω), and 2) an employed worker only has
the opportunity to search for new jobs with probability λe ≤ 1.
The first line in equation (1.12) refers to the scenario where an employed worker is
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separated from his job and becomes unemployed. With probability d(ω), the worker
separates from the firm and enters into unemployment. In this case, the employed
individual receives current utility b and continuation utility U(s′). The worker may
separate from the firm for either exogenous or endogenous reasons depending on
the wage share ω offered by their current firm. I will elaborate on the properties of
d(ω) when I discuss the firm’s problem. Briefly, however, it is clear that the level
of wage share offer ω affects the benefit of staying with a current firm. Endogenous
separations arise when the worker perceives that he is better off being unemployed
given the current wage share offer, and chooses to voluntarily leave the firm.
With probability (1 − d(ω)), the worker does not separate from the firm. In this
case, the second line of equation (1.12) denotes the case where the worker searches
in a particular sub-market (xk, µk, yk, τ) but is unable to find an alternative job that
pays wage share xk. With probability (1 − d(ω))(1 − λep(θ)), the worker is unable
to find an alternative job and he instead enjoys current expected utility Eωqijl
and continuation utility V (ω′, s′). With probability (1 − d(ω))λep(θ), the worker
is successful in finding an alternate job that pays current wage share xk and with
continuation utility V (x′k, s
′). Similar to the unemployed worker’s problem, the
policy function associated with equation (1.12) is given by xek = argmax
xk
Rek(ω, s)
















Prior to the first sub-stage of vacancy posting, matched firms make new wage share
offers ω to their current workers, given z and their updated guess of their worker’s
















x∗ = x(ω) (1.16)
where p∗(θ) refers to the optimal value derived from the worker’s search problem.
Implicitly, the firm internalizes the worker’s search problem and takes into account
that his offer of ω affects the optimal submarket and sector the worker would choose
to search, as well as his decision to quit to unemployment. Explicitly, this means
that worker’s optimal choice of x is a function of the firm’s wage offer. Hence,
x∗ = x(ω). The firm takes this relationship between x∗ and the current wage offer ω
as given and therefore takes into account the worker’s probability of contacting an
alternate offer λep∗(θ(x∗, ·)) when choosing the optimal current wage share to offer.
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In equilibrium, xek = x
∗ and the firm’s optimal choice of ω∗ = ω(x∗).
Equation (1.15) represents the individual rationality constraint. Given s, there
is a range of wage shares for which the worker would prefer to be unemployed.
Consequently, the firm and the worker would agree to mutually separate with d(ω) =
1. With probability (1− d(ω))(1− λep∗(θ(x∗))), the worker stays with the firm and
the firm receives current and future expected profits of
(
(1 − ω)Eqijl + βEJ(s′)
)
.
Denote ωc(s) as the critical wage share below which the worker will choose not to
voluntarily separate from the firm, which satisfies:
b+ U(s′) = V (ωc, s)
Then for any wage above ωc, we can use the fact that d(ω) = δ, the exogenous rate
of separation. Taking first-order conditions with respect to equation (1.14), one can
solve for the firm’s optimal wage share offer. Equation (1.17) below states that the
optimal wage is chosen such that the marginal expected cost of offering a higher
wage share in terms of forgone profits is exactly equal to the expected marginal
benefit of retaining that worker. Assuming that the optimal ω ≥ ωc, we have:




(1− ω)Eqijl + βEJ(s′, x′∗)
]
(1.17)
Intuitively, the probability of the worker finding another job is decreasing in the
matched firm’s wage offer, as ω implicitly forms an individual’s reservation wage.
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An individual will never search in a sub-market in his current career that offers
compensation xk < ω, as he is better off staying in a job which offers him a higher
wage share. As the worker’s desired wage compensation, xek, is increasing in ω, this
implies that worker’s job finding rate p is decreasing in ω.
Recruiting Firms
All idle firms that decide to recruit at the start of a period are considered new firms
in that period. A firm that seeks to recruit a worker incurs vacancy posting cost κ.
The firm’s benefit to creating a vacancy in sub-market {xk, µk, yk, τ} in sector k is a
product of its hiring probability, f(θ(xk, µk, yk, τ, z, ϕ)), and its expected profits. A
firm never creates a vacancy in a submarket that doesn’t require the task the firm
uses for production, i.e. a firm that uses task l for production will never advertise in
any sub-market in sector k 6= l. In addition, a firm never creates a vacancy in any
sub-market where the cost of creating a vacancy exceeds the benefit of creating the
job. On the other hand, if the benefit exceeds the cost of creating a vacancy, the
firm would seek to open as many vacancies as possible in that sub-market. With
free entry of firms, the following condition must therefore hold for any submarket
that is visited by a positive number of applicants:
κ ≥ f(θ(xk, µk, yk, τ, z, ϕ))
(
(1− xk)Eqijk + βEJ(s′, x′∗)
)
(1.18)
and θ ≥ 0 with complementary slackness. Equation (1.18) provides us with the
firm’s optimal job creation policy. For any submarket that is active with θ > 0,
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equation (1.18) holds with equality and firms post vacancies in a submarket up to
the point where the benefit is equal to the cost of posting a vacancy. When the
benefit of creating a vacancy is strictly less than the cost, no firm creates a vacancy
in that submarket. Equation (1.18) is key to the existence of a Block Recursive
Equilibrium, which I now define as in Menzio and Shi (2010).
1.4 Equilibrium
Definition 1. A Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) consists of a market tightness
function θτ , a value function for the worker’s search problem, R, a value function
for the unemployed worker, U , a corresponding policy function for the unemployed
worker’s problem, xuk, a value function for the employed worker’s problem V , the
corresponding policy function for the employed worker, xek, a firm’s value function J ,
and contract policy functions, {ω, d(ω)}, for each type of (µ̂k, yk, τ) worker searching
for a job in sector k. These functions satisfy the following conditions:






k, ω, and d(ω) are all independent of ϕ.
2 θ satisfies equation (1.18) for all values of (xk, µk, yk, τ, z, ϕ).
3 U , Ruk and x
u
k satisfy (1.8) for all (xk, µk, yk, τ, z, ϕ).
4 Rek and x
e
k satisfy (1.11) for all (xk, µk, yk, τ, z, ϕ).
5 J , ω and d(ω) satisfy (1.14) for all s and for all τ = 1 . . . T .
The equilibrium is block-recursive, implying that all value functions and correspond-
ing policy functions are independent of ϕ, the aggregate distribution of workers
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across age, experience, perceived aptitude, precision and employment states. Im-
portantly, it is the self-selection by workers into specific submarkets that allows
value functions and policy functions to be formulated and solved independent of
the aggregate distribution of workers. When workers optimally self-select into mar-
kets, firms know that they will only meet a particular kind of worker when posting
vacancies. As such, firms do not worry about the distribution of workers when de-
ciding where to post vacancies. This stands in contrast to models of random search
where firms do not know which worker they will meet and the distribution of work-
ers across perceived aptitudes and experience affects workers’ outside options, and
consequently their wage outcomes. In a model of random search, workers would
have to forecast the evolution of the distribution of workers across their perceived
aptitudes and experience to compute their optimal bargaining wage. This problem
is potentially computationally burdensome and is avoided in a model with directed
search.
Proposition 1. There exists a block recursive equilibrium (BRE) and the unique
recursive equilibrium is block-recursive.
Proof : See the appendix. The proof of existence and uniqueness of a Block Recur-
sive Equilibrium is similar to Menzio and Shi (2009, 2010) and to Menzio, Telyukova
and Visschers (2012). However, the proof is slightly different as 1) I assume that
individuals live for a finite number of periods and 2) I assume spot wage contracts
instead of long-term dynamic wage contracts. Nonetheless, one can show by back-
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ward induction that all value functions and policy functions are independent of the
aggregate distribution of workers. Importantly, output, qijk, is independent of the
aggregate distribution of workers. Consider the problem of a recruiting firm that
seeks to post a vacancy for a worker of age T . With some abuse of notation, let
the labor tightness condition for workers of age T be denoted as θT (·). Also let all
other value functions for workers in the last age T be denoted with a subscript T .
From the free entry condition, it is easy to see that θT depends only on the vacancy
posting cost κ, the promised wage share and the realizations of the worker’s human
capital and the productivity shocks. Thus, θT is independent of the aggregate dis-
tribution of workers, ϕ. From equation (1.14), it is clear that if θT is independent
of the aggregate distribution of workers, then JT is also independent of ϕ and the
firm’s optimal choice of ω is independent of ϕ. Independence of θT and ω from ϕ
implies that the search problems for a worker in the last period of his life, either
Ruk or R
e
k, are also independent of the aggregate distribution of workers. Since R
u
k
and Rek are independent of ϕ for a worker in the last period of his life, UT and VT
are also independent of the aggregate distribution of workers. Given independence
of {UT , VT , JT} from ϕ, one can work backwards and show that the free entry con-
dition for a recruiting firm that seeks to post a vacancy for a worker of age T − 1
also has θT−1 independent of ϕ. Thus, one can work backwards and repeat the same
argument for all prior value functions.
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1.5 Comparative Statics
Proposition 2. Desired wages, xk, are increasing in perceived aptitude and in the
aggregate state, i.e. ∂xk
∂µ̂ik
> 0 and ∂xk
∂z
> 0.
Proof See the appendix. Intuitively, a worker recognizes that a higher innate ap-
titude implies that he is more productive at a particular task. Highly productive
workers are valuable to a firm as they increase output. A worker recognizes that he
can demand more compensation when he has higher aptitude. Importantly, more
positive beliefs also raise the outside option of the worker. As a worker’s search
value is increasing in his perceived aptitude, this implies that the value of unem-
ployment is also increasing. Equation (1.15) shows that when the outside option of
the worker is increasing, the firm has to offer higher wages in order to retain the
worker. Thus, overall, desired wages increase in the optimism of one’s belief about
his innate aptitude.
Desired compensation is also increasing in the level of aggregate productivity. Higher
aggregate productivity raises the expected profitability of firms and causes more
firms to post vacancies. As a result, the increase in vacancies causes the job finding
probability to rise. As it becomes easier to find jobs in all submarkets, workers will
demand higher wage compensation.
The monotonicity of desired wages in beliefs has important effects on wage growth
and job transitions in this model. In a recession, an individual faces higher search
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frictions, and optimally chooses to search in a sub-market with lower compensation
so as to raise his job-finding rate, ∂xk
∂z
> 0. As such, recessions are times when
individuals are willing to take wage cuts. If a worker stays at a job at which he
has comparative disadvantage, his perceived aptitude after observing output and
updating will be low. This in turn causes him to search in markets with lower com-
pensation if he chooses to stay in the same sector. Importantly, job finding prob-
abilities are increasing with task-specific experience. Increased experience makes
the worker valuable to the firm through two channels. First, workers with relevant
experience contribute more to production. Second, higher experience implies more
precision over the worker’s aptitude at a job. Because job-finding probabilities in-
crease in task-specific experience, an individual may choose to remain in the same
sector where he has accumulated task-specific experience even if his aptitude in that
career is not particularly high. This implies that recessions together with slow re-
coveries can lower wage growth through two channels: 1) increased search frictions
cause individuals to sacrifice wage shares for a higher job-finding rate; and 2) initial
misallocation and slow learning of one’s true type can cause agents to stay in sectors
where they have a comparative disadvantage even after they have realized their true
aptitude in that sector. This latter effect is due in part to the specificity of human
capital.
In what follows, I calibrate model parameters to match certain data moments. I solve
the model numerically and perform various exercises to explore whether the model
can generate quantitatively significant interactions between cyclical conditions at
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the time of entry and long run wage outcomes.
1.6 Calibration
Each period in my model is a quarter. In order to calibrate the parameters of my
model, I use NLSY79 data on transition rates for white male college graduates across
employment states. In particular, I use the UE, EU and EE transition rates reported
in Column 1 of Table A.5 to jointly calibrate the vacancy posting cost, the exoge-
nous rate of separation δ, and the relative probability of being able to search for a
job for employed vs. unemployed workers λe. While these targets are taken from the
NLSY79 data, they accord well with the monthly probabilities calculated from CPS
surveys.13 Using CPS data, Nagypal (2008) reports that about 0.45% of employed
college graduates transition into unemployment every month while 2.42% of college
graduates conduct EE transitions every month. These translate into quarterly EU
and EE transition rates of 1.3% and 7% respectively. While this EE transition rate
accords well with the values reported in FF(2004), the quarterly EU rate is much
lower. However, FF(2004)’s reported transition rates refer to all workers, rather
than just college graduates. Nagypal(2008) also reports a monthly EU transition
rate for all educational categories of 0.89%, which is equivalent to a 2.6% quar-
terly EU transition rate. This rate falls in the range of the numbers reported by
Shimer(2012) and FF(2004). While Nagypal (2008) does not report UE transition
rates, Shimer(2012) finds that 32% of all unemployed individuals transition to em-
ployment every quarter. Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers, using SIPP data, find
13 Quarterly transition probabilities are calculated as rquarter = 1− (1− rmonthly)3.
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that 25% of the unemployed transition to employment every month, or that 57% of
unemployed individuals enter employment every quarter. Given that the transition
probabilities in the NLSY79 dataset generally accords with the monthly transition
probabilities found in both the CPS and SIPP data, I target the transitional prob-
abilities found in the NLSY79 data to calibrate κ, δ, and λe. The unemployed’s
probability of being able to search for a job, λu, is normalized to 1.
In addition, I use NLSY79 data for college graduates on the average quarterly com-
plex job-to-job transition rate to calibrate the value of σµ. The rate of complex
job-to-job transitions in the model is strongly affected by how dispersed or noisy
beliefs are about one’s comparative advantage. I assume that the distribution of µ
is centered around a mean of 1. The gain in experience, ζ, is assumed to be 0.25 for
each quarter worked; or equivalently a worker gains one year of experience for each
year he works at a job.
Since the period in my model is a quarter, I set β = 0.987, which is consistent
with an annual interest rate of 5%. Given a modal college graduation age of 22 and
assuming an average retirement age of 62 years, I set the lifespan of an individual
to T = 160 quarters. To construct the probability transition matrix for aggregate
productivity shocks, I use the Tauchen method and set the number of grid points
for the shock to be Nz = 5. I assume that the distribution of shocks is centered
around the mean of z̄ = 1. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013) argue that the ap-
propriate business cycle indicator for labor market search frictions should be the
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labor market tightness. Using data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover
Survey (JOLTS) on the number of job openings in the private sector and combining
it with information from the BLS on the number of unemployed, I construct the
labor tightness measure, θ, to be the number of vacancies over the number of un-
employed, θ = v
u
. To identify the cyclical component of θ, I take logs and detrend
using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter with smoothness parameter 1600. The standard
deviation of the cyclical component of the labor tightness condition is roughly equal
to 0.274. Results from an AR(1) regression suggest that the quarterly persistence
of labor tightness is about 0.92. Setting the persistence of the aggregate shock to
be ρz = 0.92, I calibrate the volatility in the aggregate shock, σz, such that the
implied volatility in θ matches its counterpart in the data. This gives me a standard
deviation of σz = 0.13. I assume that idiosyncratic productivity shocks follow a
lognormal distribution with mean 1 and standard deviation σa = 0.1. The value of
σa is the quarterly analogue of the value in Hagedorn and Manovskii(2013), who use
a monthly standard deviation of 0.054 for idiosyncratic productivity shocks faced
by the firm.14
As in Shimer (2005), I set b = 0.4 for the unemployment benefit. As per the re-
lated literature (e.g. Menzio and Shi (2010), Shimer(2005), Mortensen and Nagypal
(2007)), p(θ) takes the form of p(θ) = min{θ 12 , 1}. Since Topel and Ward(1992) sug-
gest that individuals hold 6 to 7 jobs within the first ten years of their working life,
I set the number of sectors to be K = 10. In addition, I assume that the production




function exhibits decreasing returns to labor input and set α = 0.67.
Tables A.11 and A.12 detail the fixed and calibrated parameter values used. Given
the finite horizon of the model, I solve the model backwards and compute the value
functions at each period accordingly. Figure A.10 shows how closely the model
replicates the data in terms of matching the life cycle profile of complex job-to-
job transitions. Recall that the calibration exercise only targeted average lifetime
transition rates rather than the average transition rate at each age. Similar to the
data, the model predicts that the first few years of an individual’s life are spent
searching for a career. While the model predicts a similar exponential decay in
the lifetime path of complex job-to-job transitions, it does slightly underpredict the
amount of complex job-to-job transitions in later years. Nonetheless, the model
matches the overall life cycle profile of complex job-to-job transitions.
1.7 Numerical Simulations
1.7.1 Effect of Worker Characteristics on the Job-Finding Probability
I examine how worker characteristics affect the job-finding probabilities of individ-
uals. Throughout this paper, I assume that a recession (boom) is a one standard
deviation dip (rise) in aggregate productivity from its mean. Figure A.11 shows
the economy in a recession and examines how perceived aptitudes affect job finding
probabilities for a new entrant to the labor market. Notably, individuals with high
perceived aptitude, µ̂ik - defined as a level of aptitude one standard deviation above
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the mean and as shown by the dot-dash line - have higher job-finding probabilities
than their peers with lower perceived aptitudes at a particular career. Intuitively,
firms like workers with higher levels of productivity at the task required for pro-
duction. As such, more vacancies requiring high aptitude are created, and thus the
labor tightness function θ and consequently the worker’s job finding probability p(θ)
are increasing in µ̂ik. Figure A.11 also demonstrates that the worker’s job finding
probability is decreasing in xk, the posted wage share offer. Firms prefer to create
jobs where they can keep a larger share of the rents. Thus, for all levels of aptitude,
job finding probabilities increase in markets with lower wage offers.
Age and experience also affect individuals’ job finding probabilities. Similar to find-
ings in Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers(2012), job finding probabilities increase in
relevant experience but decrease with age. Figure A.12 shows an economy in a reces-
sion and holds constant the level of aptitude required at µk = 1. The dot-dash line
highlights the job-finding probability for an individual with five years (20 quarters)
of relevant experience in the sector and who has completed 5 years of his working
life. The dashed line shows the job-finding probability of a labor market entrant.
Noticeably, experience improves the worker’s job-finding probability at all levels of
the wage offer. This is because experience adds to the worker’s human capital and
hence enhances the firm’s profits from matching with that worker. In addition, more
experience implies that the worker has greater precision over his perceived aptitude.
In contrast, job finding probabilities decline with age. Figure A.12 demonstrates
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that a worker in the last 5 years of his working life has a much lower job finding
probability than a worker with the same experience but with 35 more years remain-
ing in his working life. Intuitively, older workers bring a lower stream of expected
profits to the firm compared to a young worker of comparable experience and apti-
tude, because older workers are likely to exit the labor market sooner. Hence, age
acts against a worker’s job finding opportunities. It is this tension between experi-
ence and age that acts towards creating a lock-in effect for workers who accumulate
a lot of experience in a field to which they are not well suited. Because older work-
ers represent a lower stream of expected future profits for firms, firms are averse to
hiring older workers with little experience. Thus, it is important to find a career
that maximizes one’s comparative advantage in the earlier years.
Figure A.13 outlines how business cycles affect the job-finding probabilities of labor
market entrants. Unsurprisingly, recessions lower the job-finding probability of an
individual for all levels of wage offers. This occurs despite the fact that each worker
represents an “investment” by the firm, as workers can gain experience specific to
that career and contribute to profits in the future.
1.7.2 Effect of Aggregate Productivity Shocks
In the following simulations, I examine how long-run labor market outcomes are
affected by initial conditions. To do this, I examine the histories of two “twin
cohorts”, one which enters during a recession, and another which enters during a
boom. I assume that there are N = 500 heterogeneous individuals in a cohort
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and simulate the model for T = 160 quarters for 200 economies. For 100 of these
economies, I assume that the economy starts in a severe recession, in which z is two
standard deviations below the mean, and for the other 100 economies, I assume that
the economy starts in an expansion, in which z is initially two standard deviations
above the mean. This gives rise to a difference of about 5.2 percentage points in
the unemployment rate for the entering cohorts. Notably, the unemployment rate
during the 1980s recession rose by close to 5 percentage points from 5.9 percent in
1979Q4 to 10.7 percent in 1982Q4. Thus, the size of the aggregate productivity
drop in this simulation exercise gives rise to an increase in the unemployment rate
that is consistent with the increase in unemployment in the 1980s recession.
Each individual at time t = 0 draws their K × 1 vector of true aptitudes µi from
a standard normal distribution. This vector of aptitudes µi is unknown to each in-
dividual. Individuals observe a noisy initial signal of their true vector of aptitudes,
denoted as µ̂i,0, where µ̂i,0 = µi + ε, which forms their initial prior of their compar-
ative advantage.
Figure A.14 is the analogue of the exercise conducted in Figure A.4 but with the
simulated data. The vertical axis denotes the survival probability of staying within
the initial career, i.e. no complex job change, while the horizontal axis denotes the
quarters since entry. The solid line refers to workers who enter in an expansion
while the dashed line refers to workers who enter in a recession. In the model,
workers who enter the job market during a recession observe a significant delay in
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their first between-career change. Table A.13 highlights the results from estimating
a proportional hazards duration model on the simulated data, where the main re-
gressor is a dummy variable indicating whether the worker entered the job market
during a recession.15 Column 1 presents results on the probability of never doing a
complex job change while Column 2 looks at the probability of never doing a simple
job change. From Column 1, entering the job market during a recession lowers the
hazard rate of the first complex job change by 32%. Figure A.15 demonstrates the
survival probability of having no simple job change. Compared to the results on
complex job changes, entering the job market during a recession has a much more
muted impact on the probability of never doing a simple job change. From Column
2 of Table A.13, entering during a recession reduces the hazard ratio by 5%. As in
the empirical data, the simulated model demonstrates that recessions impact early
between-career changes more strongly than within-career changes.
While Figure A.14 looks at the duration before the first complex job change, Figure
A.16 looks at the differences in between-career transition rates over the life cycle
for workers who enter in a recession relative to those who enter in a boom. Figure
A.16 demonstrates that workers who enter during a recession have muted complex
job-to-job transition rates earlier in their working life. This is a direct by-product
of the higher search frictions faced during a recession. Weak labor markets impede
early job experimentation, which is crucial to learning one’s comparative advantage.
Notably, there is no subsequent catch-up in complex job-to-job transitions even once
15 As before, the duration model assumes the standardized Weibull distribution.
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the economy recovers. Intuitively, job experimentation more costly for older workers
for two reasons: first, the experience gained in the current sector improves both the
individual’s job-finding probability and expected wage return within that sector,
but is not transferable to a different sector; and second, switching to a new career
is a gamble, as the individual not only has less certainty about his skill level at a
new sector, but also lacks relevant experience and faces lower job-finding opportu-
nities as he is older and represents a smaller stream of expected future profits to the
firm. The lack of precision and relevant experience implies that an individual may
be forced to accept a wage cut to improve his job-finding probability if he switches
careers when the economy recovers. Because of this, some individuals optimally
remain in the same career, resulting in a lock-in effect and consequently no catch-up
in complex job-to-job transitions even after the economy has recovered.
Figure A.17 illustrates how the lock-in effect can occur. Consider an individual with
the set of true aptitudes and intial priors as given in Table A.14. The individual
has comparative advantage in sector 1. However, at the time of entry, he believes
that he has highest aptitude at sector 2. As such, the individual initially chooses
sector 2. This is true for both expansions and recessions. The “X”s and “O”s in
the figure represent the sector the individual searches in each period after entering
during a recession and expansion respectively, while the solid line and dashed line
represent the sector the individual winds up in at the end of each period. Upon
working in sector 2, the individual revises his belief of his aptitude in sector 2 and
seeks a job in his next best guess, sector 6. However, due to the persistence of the
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aggregate shock, the individual who entered during a boom is able to move to sector
6 immediately while the individual who entered during a recession is ‘unlucky’ and
unable to move. The individual who entered during a boom, upon working in sector
6, revises down his prior and moves to his next best guess, sector 1. Subsequently,
this individual continues to work and search within sector 1 as that is where his
true comparative advantage lies. In contrast, the individual who was ‘stuck’ during
the recession in sector 2 stops seeking to switch sectors after quarter 5, as he has
accumulated enough experience such that it is no longer worth switching to sector 6.
This decline in early job experimentation plays out in future wage outcomes. Figure
A.18 shows how the model-generated wage loss gap evolves for cohorts of individuals
entering at different points over the business cycle. The wage loss gap is calculated
as the percentage difference in average take-home wages between individuals who
entered during a recession and individuals who entered during a boom, conditional
on being employed. The top panel shows the time path of the gap in aggregate
productivity zt, while the bottom panel shows how long wages take to recover. The
initial wage loss conditional on being employed is about 44% in the model. This
loss comes from two sources. Firstly, the aggregate shock lowers average output
and consequently the average wage return. Secondly, there are fewer vacancies open
during a recession offering a higher wage share. As such, workers accept lower wage
share offers during recessions in order to raise their probability of getting a job.
This wage loss persists even after the economy recovers. The aggregate shock disap-
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pears after about 5 years. The wage gap, in contrast, is only closed after 60 quarters
(15 years). There is significant catch-up in wages as the economy recovers; by the
20th quarter, the wage loss is about 6 per cent. This rapid catch up is largely due to
the recovery in the aggregate shock. However, wage losses continue as individuals
are working in sectors that do not maximize their comparative advantage. These
wage losses are not permanent, as individuals are able to conduct simple job changes
and move up the wage ladder once the economy recovers. Over time, comparative
advantage plays a smaller role in human capital formation and wage returns as ex-
perience accumulates. At the same time, some individuals conduct complex job
changes when the economy recovers and move into careers at which they have com-
parative advantage. However, their lack of relevant human capital depresses the
wage outcomes of individuals who re-start their careers.
Figure A.19 breaks down the sources of persistent wage differences by showcasing
the differences in career-specific experience accumulated as well as the extent of
misallocation. The upper panel of Figure A.19 highlights the difference in the aver-
age amounts of career-specific experience between individuals who entered during a
recession and those who entered in a boom. Note that in the first five years, differ-
ences in relevant career-specific experience are negligible despite the unemployment
rate being higher for an individual who entered in a recession. This lack of differ-
ence arises because individuals who enter during a boom spend the first few years
searching for their ideal career. As experience is not transferable across careers,
individuals who enter during a boom do not gain significantly more relevant career-
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specific experience early on than their counterparts who enter in a recession.
However, individuals who enter in a boom are quicker to find careers that match
their comparative advantage. The bottom panel of Figure A.19 depicts the average
percentage difference in aptitude at the current job between individuals who entered
in a boom and individuals who entered in a recession. While there is little differ-
ence in relevant career-specific experience initially between individuals who enter
in a boom and a recession, the percentage difference in aptitude at the current job
widens in the first few years, with individuals who enter during a recession having
consistently lower aptitudes at their current job. When individuals first enter the
job market, the amount of misallocation amongst the two ‘twin’ cohorts is about the
same, as individuals do not initially know their comparative advantage. Within the
first five years (20 quarters), however, individuals who enter the job market during
a boom quickly conduct complex job changes and move into careers at which they
have comparative advantage. In contrast, high search frictions prevent individuals
who enter during a recession from experimenting and moving into careers where
they might have comparative advantage. As such, the percentage difference in apti-
tudes between individuals who enter in a recession and those who enter in a boom
becomes sharply negative in the first five years. This difference reaches its peak at
24 quarters. At this point, the proportion of individuals working in the “wrong”
sector is 10% higher for those who entered in a recession than for those who entered
in a boom. The corresponding average percentage difference in aptitudes is about
4%. The majority of the 6 percent wage gap observed after 20 quarters is thus due
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to misallocation.
Once the economy has recovered, some of the individuals who entered in a reces-
sion conduct complex changes in order to find careers that suit their comparative
advantage. This can be seen from the narrowing difference in log aptitudes after
24 quarters. However, because a complex job change requires a sacrifice of experi-
ence earlier accumulated, the convergence in aptitudes is accompanied by a rising
difference in career-specific experience accumulated between individuals who enter
in a recession and a boom. After 24 quarters, individuals who entered in a recession
start to record lower amounts of career-specific experience on average than their
counterparts who entered in a boom. By the time the wage gap is roughly closed
at about 60 quarters, the proportion of individuals working in the wrong career is
still about 2% higher for the cohort that entered in a recession than the cohort that
entered in a boom. The corresponding percentage difference in aptitude is about
1% while the difference in career-specific experience amounts to over three-quarters
of a period.
It is important to note that these gaps in career-specific experience and aptitude
have both a direct and indirect effect on wage outcomes. Firstly, lower levels of
aptitude and career-specific experience directly translate into lower output at a job.
This in turn causes wages to fall. Secondly, aptitude and career-specific experi-
ence factor into the wage shares that workers can demand. Recall that a currently
matched firm chooses the wage share to offer a worker at the start of the period
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based on his revised estimate of the worker’s type as well as the worker’s experience.
A worker with low perceived aptitude may be offered a low wage share since he is not
as productive as previously expected. As in equation (1.13),the worker’s expected
utility from staying with the current firm forms the worker’s outside option, which
in turn influences the optimal sub-market that a worker would choose to search for
a new job. Lower wage share offers from the worker’s current firm put downward
pressure on the wage share offer, xk, that a worker targets in his search. In addi-
tion, the worker’s experience in other sectors also affects his ability to find a job in
an alternative career, and consequently affects the wage share he can demand from
a new sector. It is the combination of the direct effects of human capital and its
indirect effects through the wage share that causes the 6% wage gap observed even
after the aggregate economy has recovered 20 quarters after initial entry.
Although the difference in log aptitudes never completely vanishes and the difference
in career-specific experience stabilizes at around one period, the wage gap disappears
by the 60th quarter. Percentage differences in wage outcomes become negligible as
workers gain more experience. By 60 quarters, workers have roughly close to 14
years of experience. Any persistent misallocation or differences in experience at this
point are too small in percentage terms to have any significant impact on wages.
Overall, the model predicts a present value wage loss of 3.7% over fifteen years.
Approximately a quarter of these losses is due to misallocation or working at a job
where the worker is less productive, while another one-fifth of the present value wage
losses is due to the differences in career-specific experience gained.
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1.7.3 Comparison of Benchmark Model with Other Alternatives
This paper argues that both learning and specific human capital are essential to
explaining persistent wage losses experienced by workers entering the labor mar-
ket in a recession. In this section, I compare my benchmark model to two simpler
alternatives. First, I consider a model where agents have to learn their compara-
tive advantage but there is no specific human capital. Instead, experience gained is
transferable between any job. Differences in aptitude merely imply that an individ-
ual is more productive in one particular career over another. Second, I consider a
model in which there is specific human capital but individuals have perfect knowl-
edge of their comparative advantage.
Figure A.20 shows the evolution of the percentage wage gap in the three model
specifications from quarters 10 to 70. The vertical line at 20 quarters marks the
point where the aggregate shock has disappeared and the economy has recovered.
The solid line refers to the benchmark model with both learning and specific hu-
man capital. The dash-dot line represents the model with general human capital
and learning only while the dashed line represents the model with specific human
capital and no learning. Compared to the benchmark model where the wage gap
closes in 60 quarters, Figure A.20 shows that the model with learning and general
human capital closes the wage gap in 44 quarters while there is almost no persistent
wage loss in the model with specific human capital and no learning, in the sense
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that wages converge once the economy has recovered.
The model with only specific human capital and no learning thus is the least able
to explain persistent wage losses. In this model, there is no misallocation, the only
difference between the two cohorts aside from the direct effect of the aggregate shock
itself comes from the amount of experience accumulated. Because cohorts who en-
ter in a recession face an unemployment rate that is about 5 percentage points
higher, this leads to differences in human capital accumulation. However, because
each individual knows his aptitude perfectly, individuals always direct their search
towards the sector at which they have comparative advantage. The difference in
career-specific experience is thus small in the model with only specific human capi-
tal and no learning. Figure A.21 shows that there is no significant misallocation in
the model with no learning, and less than half a period’s difference in career-specific
experience. As such, the wage losses evaporate with the recovery of the economy.
Compared to the model with specific human capital and no learning, the model
with learning and general human capital does better in generating persistent wage
losses. Similar to the benchmark model, the difference in misallocation widens for
a few years after entry into the labor market and reaches its zenith at around 26
quarters. The widening in aptitudes comes from the fact that individuals who enter
in a boom are able to conduct complex job changes early and find careers where they
have comparative advantage. In contrast, indivduals who enter in a recession face a
delay in their learning. However, the percentage difference in aptitudes in the model
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with learning and general human capital is much smaller than that observed in the
benchmark model. This is because the presence of specific human capital raises
the cost of switching careers. Individuals who enter in a recession and who start
in the wrong career find it easier to switch jobs once the economy recovers when
human capital is general, as experience gained at one’s current career is completely
transferable to another career. Workers are therefore not penalized for switching
careers. In addition, as an individual works at his current job, he gains experience
that is relevant to all other careers. With general human capital, the increase in
experience contributes towards improving the worker’s job-finding rate at all careers.
As such, there is less misallocation in a model with learning and general human
capital, as experience gained makes it easier for workers to conduct complex job
changes. Consequently, the overall wage gap in a model with learning and general
human capital is smaller than that observed in the benchmark model.
1.7.4 Comparison of Model with Linear Wage Regression
A key remaining question concerns how well the mechanism in the model explains
the timing and magnitude of the wage losses observed in the data. An important
point to note is that the calculated wage loss in the simulated data is conditional on
the fact that the only difference between the two twin cohorts is their initial entry
conditions. In the actual data, however, it is likely that there exists other observ-
able and unobservable differences between each cohort that enters the market. In
addition, the data-generating process for aggregate shocks in the simulated model
is unlikely to be exactly the same as the aggregate shock process that hits the real
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economy. As such, I conduct the following exercise to compare the simulated wage
loss from my model to the data.
To compare the wage loss implied my simulated model to the data, I use the esti-
mated linear wage regression coefficients from Equation (1.1) to calculate the pre-
dicted wage loss if individuals experienced the same aggregate shock process as in
my simulated model. In particular, I plug in the sequence of unemployment rates
as implied by the aggregate shock process in my simulated model. I assume that all
individuals have the same AFQT score. Holding all else constant, this implies the
following predicted wage loss calculation:
∆ln(wt) = α̂1∆u0 + α̂2∆u0 ∗ Pot.Expt + β̂1∆ut (1.19)
where the ∆ refers to the difference between a cohort that entered in a recession
versus a boom. As aforementioned, a recession in the simulated model assumes
an aggregate shock such that there is a difference of 5.2 percentage points in the
unemployment rate for the entering cohorts. Thus, the difference in unemployment
rate at entry, ∆u0, is fixed at 5.2 in the predicted wage loss calculation. ∆ut cap-
tures how the difference in unemployment rates in the simulated model varies over
time. Notably, the difference in unemployment rates narrows very quickly with the
recovery of economy. Differences in the unemployment rate are negligible by the 8th
quarter.16
16 This result is perhaps unsurprising since we needed to introduce a very large aggregate shock
in the economy to have an increase in the unemployment rate by 5 percentage points.
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Figure A.23 shows the predicted wage loss from the linear regression model given
the same sequence in unemployment rates as the simulated model. The red solid line
documents the simulated wage loss from the benchmark model while the grey line
dotted with triangles shows the predicted wage loss implied by the linear regression
model given the same sequence of difference in unemployment rates. The top panel
of Figure A.23 again shows the path of the aggregate shock over time. In Figure
A.23, the linear regression coefficients suggests that a 5 percentage point increase in
the unemployment rate at entry gives rise to an initial wage loss of about 42 percent.
This wage gap narrows to 15% by the 20th quarter and completely fades by the 63rd
quarter. Note that the linear regression coefficients imply that the wage losses turn
into wage gains after the 63rd quarter. This result is somewhat mechanical and
occurs as the positive coefficient on the interaction term of u0 ∗ Pot.Expt implies a
constant gain to wages. As such, Figure A.23 is truncated at 80 quarters since any
differences between the predicted wage loss implied by the linear regression coeffi-
cients and the simulated model after the 64th quarter are due to this mechanical
result.
In general, the simulated wage loss closely matches the predicted wage loss from
the linear regression model in the first 10 quarters, but deviates significantly there-
after. This is because differences in unemployment rates are negligible by period 10
although the aggregate shock has not completely recovered yet as shown in the top
panel of Figure A.23. From the 10th quarter onwards, the predicted wage loss from
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the linear regression model is completely driven by the difference in unemployment
rate at entry and the catch-up implied by the interaction term. In contrast, the
simulated model shows faster catch-up and a non-linear recovery in wages. This
non-linear catch-up in wages is not surprising. Recall that wages in the model are
affected by both the aggregate shock, a worker’s aptitude and experience as well
as the wage share that he can demand. Since the wage share that a worker can
demand is increasing in the worker’s estimate of his aptitude, his experience and
the aggregate state, this suggests that simulated wage paths should be non-linear
and history-dependent. Overall, these results are suggestive of how much the pro-
posed mechanism in the simulated model can account for wage losses relative to the
predicted wage loss from a linear regression model. I leave estimating the structural
parameters of the model to future work.
1.7.5 Mature Workers
While the model is able to generate persistent wage losses for labor market entrants,
recessions in this model do not create persistent wage losses for older workers. This
is mainly due to the fact that mature workers are more likely to have already iden-
tified their ideal careers. There are therefore no losses stemming from a decline in
job experimentation or from accumulating irrelevant experience. Figure A.24 shows
the time path of percentage wage losses for a mature worker who experiences a
recession 40 quarters after his entry into the labor market. The top panel again
highlights the path of the path aggregate shock while the lower panel highlights
the percentage wage difference between individuals who experienced a recession 40
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quarters after entry and individuals who experienced an expansion 40 quarters after
entry. Figure A.24 highlights that for mature workers, the wage gap closely tracks
the recovery in the economy. The wage gap closes by quarter 60, which is about the
same time required for the negative aggregate shock to disappear. This is largely
because mature workers have already identified their ideal sector and continue to
accumulate relevant experience during the recession. Wages catch up rapidly when
the economy recovers, as mature workers can easily conduct simple job changes to
re-climb the wage ladder. This quick recovery in wages is similar to the recovery
seen in the model with only specific human capital and no learning, another case in
which recessions do not cause workers to waste time in suboptimal sectors.
The model results for mature workers are at odds with the empirical literature on
displaced workers and persistent earnings losses. This may be because a recession in
the model uniformly affects all sectors in the economy. This is not necessarily true
in reality. Recessions may affect some sectors more than others, and in certain cases
may coincide with permanent sectoral decline. The loss of a sector or a particular
career in the labor market can leave mature workers with accumulated irrelevant
experience. In this case, wage losses for mature workers may persist long after the
economy recovers as mature workers are forced to ‘re-start’ in new careers or sectors
where they 1) do not have comparative advantage and 2) do not have relevant
experience. In the worst case scenario, long-term unemployment may also result,
given that the worker’s age, low aptitude and lack of experience in other sectors
severely hinder his job-finding probability. To observe how this can occur, the basic
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model would need to be extended to incorporate differential sectoral shocks. This
will be left for future work.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper investigates a possible channel for why individuals who enter the job
market during a recession suffer persistent wage losses. In particular, this paper
suggests that early search frictions impact how individuals learn their comparative
advantage and slow down the accumulation of relevant human capital. I show using
NLSY79 data that job search strategies over the life cycle are affected by initial
business cycle conditions and build a model to explain these empirical findings.
While this paper has focused exclusively on aggregate shocks, future work will in-
corporate how the interaction of aggregate and sectoral shocks may affect the wage
losses of both new entrants and mature workers. In particular, one can embed sector-
specific shocks in the model and show how sectoral trends would affect individuals’
search decisions. In some cases, an individual may forego searching according to
comparative advantage if a recession coincides with permanent sectoral shifts.
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APPENDIX
Chapter A: Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Data
A.1.1 Overlap of Between and Within Career Changes with Complex and Simple
Job Definitions
As a quick check on whether complex job changes coincide with the notion of a
career change, I use the Dictionary of Occupation Titles to check if a complex job
change overlaps with a significant change in tasks required to work in that career.
One caveat about using the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOTs) is that the
DOTs data by design, only provides information on the tasks performed in each
occupation. There is thus no correspondence to industry codes. If a career in-
volves some level of industry-specific knowledge, the DOTs data would not be able
to capture this specificity of human capital. Nonetheless, the DOTs data provides
a preliminary check on whether the suggested measure of complex and simple job
changes capture between and within career changes respectively. To this end, I cal-
culate a measure of task-distances involved in each occupation change observed in
the data and measure the overlap with complex and simple job changes.
While the DOTs data classifies occupations along many dimensions, I use the most
basic classification of tasks involved in occupations to construct the measure of task
distances. The primary classification for occupations is the requirements for working
with “Data,” “People,” and “Things.” The category “Data” relates to the necessity
of processing and using information. Individuals are ranked from a score of 1 to
6, with the lowest number coding for the most complex task (for e.g. synthesizing
data), and the highest number relates to the simplest task (e.g. copying data). The
other two categories, “People” and “Things”, are ranked in the same order with
most complex tasks in that category being given the lowest number (i.e. 1). The
category “People” looks at the necessity of relating to others in one’s occupation,
while “Things” looks at the ability to use and manipulate physical objects. As a
starting point, I use the information from “Data”, “People” and “Things” to look
at the task differences between occupations.
A.1.2 Measure of Distance between Occupations
Because this paper looks at multi-dimensional skill sets, an important questions sur-
rounds how we should quantify the differences between occupations. From the previ-
ous section, the task complexity involved in each occupation can be coded as a three-
dimensional vector. This three-dimensional vector can be thought as describing a
position in the task space. Following Gathmann and Schonberg(2010)Gathmann
and Schonberg (2010), I measure the distance between two occupations (o and o′)
as one minus the angular separation in task space. Let A be the 3× 1 vector of oc-
cupation o and B be the 3× 1 vector of occupation o′. Then the angular separation
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and accordingly, the distance between occupations o and o′ is given by:
Distanceoo′ = 1− Angular Separationoo′ (A.1.2)
Equation (A.1.1) defines the distance between two occupations as the cosine an-
gle between their positions in vector space. Following Gathmann and Schonberg
(2010), defining distance as one minus the angular separation provides us with a
simple monotonic single-dimensional index to look at the distance between occu-
pations. The measure is bounded between zero and one inclusive; the measure is
zero for occupations that employ identical tasks and one if the two occupations use
completely different tasks. Hence, by looking at the angular separation of jobs in
the task space, we can collapse multidimensional vectors into a measurable single
dimensional index.
The distribution of occupational changes in the dataset is positively skewed, most
occupation changes involve small differences between tasks, suggesting that indi-
viduals tend to stay within jobs that are similar. The maximum distance between
occupation changes observed in the NLSY79 data was about 0.82. The mean task
distance between occupations was 0.12 and the median task distance was about 0.06.
About 85 per cent of our measure of simple job changes are captured as having a
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task distance below the mean of 0.12. In contrast, 45 per cent of our measure of
complex job changes have a task distance above the mean of 0.12.
A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Existence of BRE
In this section, I prove that a Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) exists by back-
ward induction. The proof is similar to that of Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers
(2012). In what follows, I show that the value functions, policy functions and la-
bor market tightness condition for each sub-market is independent of the aggregate
distribution of workers, ϕ. This independence from the aggregate distribution of
workers allows us to solve the model in a block recursive manner.
Given that each individual lives for only T periods, consider a firm that posts a
vacancy for an individual of age τ = T . Re-arranging the free-entry condition for






Note that θT depends only on parameters and the expected share of output the
recruiting firm gets to keep. From equation (1.7), it is clear that output depends
on the aggregate state only through z, aggregate productivity for that period. In
addition, the expected output of the worker is in no way affected by the aggregate
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distribution of workers as the firm is able to specify exactly what kind of worker
he desires. In particular, the human capital requirements of {µk, yk} are specified
whenever a firm posts a vacancy. By posting the level of experience required, yk,
the firm also implicitly determines the probability distribution of µk as there exists
a one-for-one mapping between career-specific experience and the precision of the
worker’s type. Thus, the probability that the worker truly has µk levels of aptitude
is independent of the aggregate distribution of workers. Hence, θT is entirely inde-
pendent of the aggregate distribution of workers, ϕ.
Given the independence of θT from ϕ, it follows that p
∗(θT ) from equation (1.14)
does not depend on ϕ and therefore, the firm’s maximization problem, JT , is also
independent of the aggregate distribution of workers. Consequently, the optimal
wage share to offer is also independent from the aggregate distribution of workers.
This can be seen by re-writing equation (1.17) for a firm attached to a worker in
the last period of his life:




From equation (A.2.2), it clear that ω is depends on θT , λ
e and expected output.
Since Eqijl and θT do not depend on ϕ, ω does not depend on ϕ.
Turning to the search problem of an employed worker at age T, notice that we can
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re-write Rek as:




λep(θT )Exkqijk + (1− λep(θT ))Eωqijl
]
(A.2.3)
From equation (A.2.3), it is clear that independence of θT , ω and Eqijk from ϕ im-
plies that Rek is independent of the aggregate distribution of workers. Analogously,
Ruk is also independent of ϕ. Since {Ruk , Rek} are independent of ϕ for all k for indi-
viduals for age T , it follows that VT and UT are also independent of the aggregate
distribution of workers.
Given that JT is independent of ϕ, we can return to the problem of a recruiting firm




E(1− xk)qijk + βEJT (s′, x′∗)
Since JT is independent from ϕ, the above equation implies that θT−1 is also in-
dependent of this period’s aggregate distribution of workers. Since all T − 1 value
functions depend on θT−1 and on T value functions, and since θT−1 and T value
functions are independent of ϕ, it follows that all T − 1 value functions are also
independent of the aggregate distribution of workers. One can continuously repeat
this argument to all prior periods until τ = 1.
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A.2.2 Proof of Monotonicity in Wages in Beliefs
Since the search problem of the unemployed worker and employed worker is similar,
I demonstrate only the proof for the employed worker’s problem. Differentiating


































[∂E(xkqijk + βVτ+1(x′k, s′))
∂µ̂ik




I first focus on the numerator in equation (A.2.4). Note that the job-finding proba-
bility of a worker is decreasing in the desired compensation, px < 0, while the job-
finding probability of a worker is increasing in his level of perceived aptitude, µk.
As workers like high-pay, many workers would flood a vacancy offering a high wage
share offer xk, causing congestion to arise and p(θτ ) to decline in xk. In contrast,
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firms like to post vacancies requiring high perceived aptitude, while not many work-
ers may satisfy such a requirement. Hence, a worker with high perceived aptitude
has a higher chance of finding a job, hence pµ > 0. Expected income is increasing
in higher perceived aptitude as demonstrated by
∂Eqijk
∂µ̂ik
> 0, as a higher aptitude at
one’s job naturally translates into higher output. Notably, since no individual will
search for a job which offers less expected utility than the current job, i.e. an individ-
ual would only apply to a job with E(xqijk+βVτ+1(x
′
k, s
′)) ≥ E(ωqijl+βVτ+1(ω′, s′)),











. In addition, concavity of
the production function in µik implies that the marginal expected life-time utility
is declining in µ̂ik. Thus, the term B is strictly non-positive, implying that px(θτ )B
is strictly non-negative. Hence, it is clear that the numerator of equation (A.2.4) is
strictly positive.
Focusing on the denominator A, we first note that concavity of p implies that
pxx < 0. As aforementioned, an individual never looks for a job that offers him less





′, s′)) > 0. Expected output is always non-negative and px is aforemen-
tioned strictly less than zero. As the whole equation is multiplied by (−1), this
implies that A is strictly greater than zero and hence, desired wage compensations




A.2.3 Proof of Monotonicity of Wages in Belief of TFP
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Equation (A.2.5) is analogous to equation (A.2.4) . Note that the job finding proba-
bility is directly increasing in z, i.e. pz > 0 and expected utility from income is also
increasing in the perceived level of aggregate productivity,
∂Eqijk
∂z
> 0. In addition,







searching for a job is also positive. Given concavity of the production function in










and the numerator in equation (A.2.5) is strictly positive and ∂xk
∂z
is also strictly positive.
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A.3 Tables and Figures
Tab. A.1: Impact of Initial Unemployment Rate on Log Wages of College Graduates
National Regional
Variable 1 2 3 4
OLS IV OLS IV
u0,i -6.358
∗∗∗ -4.982∗∗ -4.657∗∗ -4.391∗
(1.085) (2.074) (1.587) (2.504)
Pot. Exp ∗u0,i 0.035 0.077 0.008 0.021
(0.037) (0.184) (0.054) (0.113)
uit -3.815
∗∗∗ -4.130∗∗∗ -2.670∗∗∗ -2.725∗∗∗
(0.361) (0.431) (0.635) (0.450)
AFQT 0.335∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.056) (0.092) (0.072)
Potential Experience 1.569∗∗∗ 1.255 1.837∗∗∗ 1.739∗∗
(0.356) (1.375) (0.464) (0.860)
Potential Experience2 -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
F-stat (1st stage: u0,i) - 26.91 - 26.88
F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i) - 923.54 - 752.35
N 22109 22109 22053 22053
Dependent variable is log wage. IV first stage regression includes the unemployment rate at age 22, and the
unemployment rate at 22*potential experience. Columns 1 and 2 look at the effect of the national unemployment
rate at entry on the probability of being employed for college graduates, Columns 3 and 4 look at the effect of the
regional unemployment rate at entry. Coefficients reported in terms of percentage points. All regressions include
region dummies. Robust standard errors are reported and all standard errors are clustered by birth year. “F-stat
(1st stage: u0,i)” refers to the F-test associated with equation (1.2) while “F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i)”
refers to the F-test associated with equation (1.3). Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Tab. A.2: Impact of Initial Unemployment Rate on Log Wages of High School Graduates
National Regional
Variable 1 2 3 4
OLS IV OLS IV
u0,i -1.834 -2.841
∗∗ -1.883 -2.782∗∗∗
(1.188) (1.225) (0.958) (0.823)
Pot. Exp ∗u0,i 0.032 0.048∗∗∗ 0.029 0.062∗∗
(0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.027)
uit -2.169
∗∗∗ -2.275∗∗∗ -1.877∗∗∗ -1.889∗∗∗
(0.267) (0.345) (0.447) (0.275)
AFQT 0.345∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035)
Potential Experience 1.045∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 1.060∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.134) (0.183) (0.228)
Potential Experience2 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F-stat (1st stage: u0,i) - 59.44 - 72.63
F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i) - 961.06 - 1072.48
N 42065 42065 41402 41402
Dependent variable is log wage. IV first stage regression includes the unemployment rate at age 18, and the
unemployment rate at 18*potential experience. Columns 1 and 2 look at the effect of the national unemployment
rate at entry on log wages of high school graduates, Columns 3 and 4 look at the effect of the regional unemployment
rate at entry. Coefficients reported in terms of percentage points. All regressions include region dummies. Robust
standard errors are reported and all standard errors are clustered by birth year. “F-stat (1st stage: u0,i)” refers to
the F-test associated with equation (1.2) while “F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i)” refers to the F-test associated
with equation (1.3). Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Tab. A.3: Probability of Being Employed (College Graduates)
National Regional
Variable 1 2 3 4
OLS IV OLS IV
u0,i -0.459 1.021 -0.434 0.585
(0.552) (2.702) (0.310) (1.402)
Pot. Exp ∗u0,i 0.008 -0.044 0.005 -0.031
(0.008) (0.052) (0.006) (0.024)
ut -0.561 -0.648 -0.362 -0.502
(0.377) (0.571) (0.288) (0.405)
AFQT 0.005 0.015 0.009 0.017
(0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)
Potential Experience 0.345∗∗ 0.725∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.398) (0.086) (0.191)
Potential Experience2 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F-stat (1st stage: u0,i) - 33.79 - 32.04
F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i) - 964.52 - 807.23
N 24350 24350 24150 24150
Dependent variable is the probability of being employed. IV first stage regression includes the unemployment rate
at age 22, and the unemployment rate at 22*potential experience. Columns 1 and 2 look at the effect of the national
unemployment rate at entry on log wages of college graduates, Columns 3 and 4 look at the effect of the regional
unemployment rate at entry. Coefficients reported in terms of percentage points. All regressions include region
dummies. Robust standard errors are reported and all standard errors are clustered by birth year. “F-stat (1st
stage: u0,i)” refers to the F-test associated with equation (1.2) while “F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i)” refers
to the F-test associated with equation (1.3). Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Tab. A.4: Probability of Being Employed (High School Graduates)
National Regional
Variable 1 2 3 4
OLS IV OLS IV
u0,i -0.946
∗ -0.405 -0.705∗∗ -0.628
(0.372) (1.026) (0.241) (0.942)
Pot. Exp ∗u0,i 0.012 -0.008 0.005 -0.012
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007)
ut -1.562
∗∗∗ -1.574∗∗∗ -0.769∗∗ -0.873∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.203) (0.243) (0.125)
AFQT 0.075∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.021)
Potential Experience 0.554∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.141) (0.054) (0.089)
Potential Experience2 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
F-stat (1st stage: u0,i) - 78.94 - 80.63
F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i) - 431.44 - 328.34
N 44023 44023 44023 44023
Dependent variable is the probability of being employed. IV first stage regression includes the unemployment rate
at age 18, and the unemployment rate at 18*potential experience. Columns 1 and 2 look at the effect of the national
unemployment rate at entry on the employability of high school graduates while columns 3 and 4 look at the effect
of the regional unemployment rate at entry. Coefficients reported in terms of percentage points. All regressions
include region dummies. Robust standard errors are reported and all standard errors are clustered by birth year.
“F-stat (1st stage: u0,i)” refers to the F-test associated with equation (1.2) while “F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp
∗u0,i)” refers to the F-test associated with equation (1.3). Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Tab. A.5: Transition Probabilities
Variable Data (College) Data (High School) Shimer (2012) FF(2004) FF*
UE 0.532 0.317 0.321 0.283 0.631
(0.193) (0.086) (0.050) (0.029)
EU 0.048 0.052 0.020 0.013 0.038
(0.042) (0.041) (0.003) (0.001)
EE 0.055 0.060 - 0.026 0.076
(0.021) (0.021) - (0.001)
Complex EE 0.032 0.039
(0.016) (0.015)
Simple EE 0.027 0.025
(0.010) (0.010)
All transition probabilities are at the quarterly frequency. FF report monthly transition probabil-
ities. Quarterly numbers (denoted as FF*) for FF calculated as rquarter = 1− (1− rmonth)3.
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Tab. A.6: Results from Proportional Hazards Model
Variable College College High Sch High Sch
Complex Simple Complex Simple
u0,i -0.074
∗ -0.050 -0.088∗ -0.013
(0.041) (0.080) (0.045) (0.032)
Potential Experience -0.347∗∗ -0.061 -0.481∗∗∗ -0.172
(0.142) (0.271) (0.059) (0.204)
Potential Experience2 0.006 -0.022 0.012∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.010) (0.023) (0.003) (0.008)
ut -0.111
∗∗ -0.058 -0.073∗∗ -0.050
(0.052) (0.050) (0.029) (0.075)
AFQT 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
N 7424 8327 17238 20926
Log-likelihood -397.595 -344.357 -836.61 -726.397
Dependent variable is the log of the hazard function. Columns 1 and 2 report results for college
graduates while columns 3 and 4 report results for high school graduates. All regressions include
region dummies. Standard errors clustered by birth year. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5%
∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Tab. A.7: College Graduates: Probability of Complex Job Change
National Regional
Variable 1 2 3 4
OLS IV OLS IV
u0,i -0.531
∗∗∗ -1.373∗ -0.469∗∗∗ -0.536∗∗
(0.084) (0.741) (0.079) (0.223)
Pot. Exp ∗u0,i 0.008∗∗∗ 0.027 0.006∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.010)
ut -0.307
∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.080) (0.078) (0.071)
AFQT -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Potential Experience -0.188∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗
(0.030) (0.131) (0.026) (0.087)
Potential Experience2 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F-stat (1st stage: u0,i) - 26.91 - 26.88
F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i) - 923.54 - 752.35
N 22109 22109 22053 22053
Dependent variable is the probability of a complex job change. IV first stage regression includes the unem-
ployment rate at age 22, and the unemployment rate at 22*potential experience. Sample limited to white
male college graduates. Columns 1 and 2 look at the effect of the national unemployment rate at entry while
columns 3 and 4 look at the effect of regional unemployment rates at the time of entry. Coefficients reported in
terms of percentage points. All regressions include region dummies. Robust standard errors are reported and
all standard errors are clustered by birth year. “F-stat (1st stage: u0,i)” refers to the F-test associated with
equation (1.2) while “F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i)” refers to the F-test associated with equation (1.3).
Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Tab. A.8: College Graduates: Probability of Simple Job Change
National Regional
Variable 1 2 3 4
OLS IV OLS IV
u0,i -0.167 -0.266 -0.201
∗∗ -0.173
(0.099) (0.168) (0.083) (0.137)
Pot. Exp ∗u0,i 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.010∗
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005)
ut -0.102 -0.112
∗∗ -0.113∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.051) (0.036) (0.033)
AFQT 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Potential Experience -0.009 -0.075 - 0.025 -0.082∗∗
(0.017) (0.054) (0.015) (0.037)
Potential Experience2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F-stat (1st stage: u0,i) - 26.91 - 26.88
F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i) - 923.54 - 752.35
N 22109 22109 22053 22053
Dependent variable is the probability of a simple job change. IV first stage regression includes the unemployment
rate at age 22, and the unemployment rate at 22*potential experience. Sample limited to white male college
graduates. Columns 1 and 2 look at the effect of the national unemployment rate at entry while columns 3
and 4 look at the effect of regional unemployment rates at the time of entry. Coefficients reported in terms
of percentage points. All regressions include region dummies. Robust standard errors are reported and all
standard errors are clustered by birth year. “F-stat (1st stage: u0,i)” refers to the F-test associated with
equation (1.2) while “F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i)” refers to the F-test associated with equation (1.3).
Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Tab. A.9: High School: Probability of a Complex Job Change
National Regional
Variable 1 2 3 4
OLS IV OLS IV
u0,i -0.125
∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗ -0.118∗ -0.205∗∗
(0.016) (0.038) (0.045) (0.088)
Pot. Exp ∗u0,i 0.001 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ut -0.392
∗∗ -0.397∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.083) (0.030) (0.085)
AFQT -0.007∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Potential Experience -0.022∗∗ -0.006∗ -0.015 -0.02∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.003) (0.013) (0.009)
Potential Experience2 1e-04∗ 2e-04∗∗ 2e-04∗ 1e-04∗∗∗
(5e-05) (5e-05) (8e-05) (3e-05)
F-stat (1st stage: u0,i) - 59.44 - 72.63
F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i) - 961.06 - 1072.48
N 42065 42065 41402 41402
Dependent variable is the probability of a complex job change. IV first stage regression includes the unemployment
rate at age 18, and the unemployment rate at 18*potential experience. Sample limited to white male high school
graduates. Columns 1 and 2 look at the effect of the national unemployment rate at entry while columns 3 and
4 look at the effect of regional unemployment rates at the time of entry. All regressions include region dummies.
Robust standard errors are reported and all standard errors are clustered by birth year. “F-stat (1st stage: u0,i)”
refers to the F-test associated with equation (1.2) while “F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i)” refers to the F-test
associated with equation (1.3). Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Tab. A.10: High School: Probability of a Simple Job Change
National Regional
Variable 1 2 3 4
OLS IV OLS IV
u0,i -0.075 -0.072
∗∗ -0.068 -0.096∗
(0.069) (0.034) (0.060) (0.057)
Pot. Exp ∗u0,i 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ut -0.194
∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045)
AFQT -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Potential Experience 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.008
(0.015) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009)
Potential Experience2 2e-04∗∗ 2e-04∗∗∗ 2e-04∗∗ 2e-04∗∗∗
(6e-05) (4e-05) (6e-05) (4e-05)
F-stat (1st stage: u0,i) - 59.44 - 72.63
F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i) - 961.06 - 1072.48
N 42065 42065 41402 41402
Dependent variable is the probability of a simple job change. IV first stage regression includes the unemployment
rate at age 18, and the unemployment rate at 18*potential experience. Sample limited to white male high school
graduates. Columns 1 and 2 look at the effect of the national unemployment rate at entry while columns 3 and
4 look at the effect of regional unemployment rates at the time of entry. All regressions include region dummies.
Robust standard errors are reported and all standard errors are clustered by birth year. “F-stat (1st stage: u0,i)”
refers to the F-test associated with equation (1.2) while “F-stat (1st stage: Pot. Exp ∗u0,i)” refers to the F-test
associated with equation (1.3). Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Tab. A.11: Parameter Space: Fixed
Variable Value Description Source/Target
T 160 40 years of working Life -
β 0.987 Discount Factor 5% interest rate
b 0.4 Unemployment Compensation Shimer(2005)
K 10 Number of Sectors -
ζ 0.25 Experience Gain 1 year of experience
ā 1 Mean of Idiosyncratic Shock -
σa 0.1 Variance of Idiosyncratic Shock Hagedorn & Manovskii(2013)
α 0.67 Labor share -
µ̄ 1 Unconditional Mean of Aptitude -
z̄ 1 Mean of Aggregate Shock -
ρz 0.92 Persistence of Aggregate Shock JOLTS data
Tab. A.12: Parameter Space: Calibrated
Variable Value Data target Model Generated
δ 0.01 mean EU: 0.048 0.043
λe 0.37 mean EE: 0.055 0.072
κ 17 mean UE: 0.532 0.538
σµ 2.06 mean Complex EE: 0.032 0.029
σz 0.13 σθ: 0.274 0.279
Note: calibrated values are determined jointly in the model.
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Dependent variable in Column 1 is the survival probability of not ever
doing a complex job change while the dependent variable in Column
2 is the survival probability of not ever doing a simple job change.
Entering in a recession is associated with a 5 percentage point increase
in the unemployment rate. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ :
1%
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Fig. A.9: Probability No Simple Change Undertaken (High School Graduates)

































Fig. A.10: Data vs. Model Simulated Lifecycle Complex EE transition rates
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Fig. A.11: Job Finding Probability Rises with Aptitude
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Fig. A.12: Job Finding Probability Rises with Experience, Declines with Age
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Fig. A.15: Simulated Survival Probability of Not Ever Doing a Simple Job Change


































Fig. A.16: Differences in Complex EE between Recession and Boom
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Fig. A.17: Example of Sector ‘Lock-in’



























Fig. A.18: Wage Loss between Entering in Booms vs. Recessions
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Difference in Career−Specific Experience
Fig. A.19: Differences in Levels of Experience and Aptitude at Current Job

























Learning w/o Specific Human Capital
Specific Human Capital w/o Learning
Fig. A.20: Percentage Wage Losses in Different Model Specifications
114













































Fig. A.21: Differences in Levels of Experience and Aptitude at Current Job (No Learning)











































Fig. A.22: Differences in Levels of Experience and Aptitude at Current Job (No Specific
Human Capital)
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Fig. A.23: Percentage Wage Losses in Simulated Data and Linear Regression Model




























Fig. A.24: Wage Loss for Mature Workers in Booms vs. Recessions
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Chapter 2: Consumer Pricing and Product Durability: Implications
for Firm Pricing Strategies
2.1 Introduction
A delayed response in prices has been deemed key for monetary shocks to
generate real effects in output. Yet, despite a plethora of research on sticky prices,
a lack of consensus on a conclusive mechanism to explain the existence of nominal
rigidities remains. This paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature by ex-
ploring how differential consumer search costs in durables and non-durable goods
can result in price rigidity as seen in the data. Understanding how consumers’ search
behavior affects firms’ pricing strategies is important; survey evidence from Blinder
et al. (1998) reveals that consumer aversion and competitive pressures are the two
most cited reasons for the lack of price adjustment by firms. In contrast, menu
costs and costly information are less cited by firms as reasons for their reluctance to
change prices. Given these findings, this paper attempts to rationalize how search
frictions in the product market affect firms’ pricing behavior for durable and non-
durable goods under different cost environments, and examines the implications of
firm pricing for overall aggregate price stickiness.
The distinction between durable and non-durable goods is not arbitrary. Durable
goods play a key role in business cycle fluctuations and tend to be one of the more
volatile components in GDP. Barsky et al. (2007) show that monetary policy is
neutral so long as durable goods are flexibly priced; this is true even if non-durable
goods exhibit price stickiness. The role of durable goods in consumption smoothing
suggests that monetary shocks can only have significant real effects on output if
durable goods are price sticky.
In addition, the considerable heterogeneity in average price durations observed
across different categories of goods suggests that the propagation effects of mone-
tary policy need not be uniform across all goods. However, it is not immediately
clear whether and/or why durable goods would have more flexible prices. Apart
from Transportation goods, it is not evident that all durable goods are more flexibly
priced than non-durable goods. Table B.1 demonstates that the majority of goods
with price duration less than 4.3 months, the mean price duration, are non-durable
goods. To this end, this paper builds a model of consumer search behavior and ex-
plores various assumptions about firms’ expectations of their costs to reconcile how
goods of different degrees of durability may exhibit differing levels of price stickiness.
A priori, durable goods may actually be more price sticky than non-durable
goods because they involve higher consumer search costs. Intuitively, searching and
attaining multiple price quotes for a non-durable product such as shampoo is signif-
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icantly easier than searching and attaining multiple price quotes for a durable good
such as a motorcycle. This variability in search costs impacts the consumer’s ability
to sample different price quotes and consequently affects the mass of loyal customers
a firm can expect to retain. This, in turn, affects the firm’s pricing strategy. For
example,when consumer search costs are negligible - i.e. consumers face little to
no costs in attaining alternative price quotes - the firm lacks a loyal customer base
and its revenues largely derive from its sales to shoppers. In such a scenario, the
firm would engage in more competitive pricing to attract shoppers and maximize his
profits. Work by Caglayan et al. (2008) show that more frequent price changes are
observed in market environments with low search costs. Using a Turkish dataset,
Caglayan et al find that the greatest turnover in prices occurs in bazaars compared
to small convenience stores and supermarkets.
Accounting for consumer search behavior can explain to some degree why vari-
ous goods have differing levels of price stickiness. Higher informational costs involved
in shopping for durable goods can explain why durable goods such as household fur-
nishings tend to have more sticky prices than non-durable goods. Nonetheless, the
data shows that there exist durable goods that are more price-flexible than non-
durables. This is particularly true for goods such as new vehicles. To account for
these features, this paper argues that the longevity or durability of the good also
matters in determining its degree of price stickiness. Because durable goods are
stock variables, consumers can choose to postpone new purchases and consume out
of their current stock when prices are too high. The longeveity of the durable good
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therefore gives the consumer added bargaining power and limits the pricing power
of the firm. The existence of extremely long-lived goods with depreciation rates
close to zero and the ability of the consumer to postpone purchases suggests that
firms selling such goods must price more competitively to ensure sales. This paper
presents a model which accounts for how consumer search behavior and the dura-
bility of the product interact to affect firms’ pricing strategies. Markets with high
consumer search costs are expected to be more price sticky and to observe higher
mark-ups as consumers are locked in and cannot switch easily to other sellers. Goods
that are longer-lived are expected to observe more competitive pricing regimes and
enjoy less of a mark-up premium since consumers can choose to delay purchases
whenever prices are deemed to be too high.
This paper is related to the consumer search models considered by Head,
Liu, Menzio and Wright (2012) and Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009). In their pa-
per, Head et al. (2012) (henceforth known as HLMW)embed the Burdett and Judd
(1983) nonsequential search structure into the Lagos and Wright (2005) monetary
framework to examine the interaction between monetary shocks and price rigidity.
They find that the incorporation of consumer search costs in a decentralized market
enables them to match many of the facts concerning prices in the micro-data such as
the average price duration and the existence of many small individual price changes
amid large changes in the average price level. HLMW observe money to be neutral
in their model; a monetary shock in their model causes the whole price distribution
to respond immediately and shift. This finding contradicts empirical results from
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Christiano et al. (1999) and that of Boivin et al. (2009). Notably, the latter observes
that even disaggregated prices are sticky in response to macroeconomic disturbances
such as monetary policy shocks although they are flexible in response to sector spe-
cific shocks. Crucially, HLMW assume that there are no customer base dynamics in
the firm’s problem and that all customers are shoppers each period. This removes
an element of price rigidity that can result from firms’ fear of antagonizing current
customers by raising prices.
Unlike HLMW, the model in this paper does not require consumers to search
decentralized markets every period but allows consumers at the start of each period
a choice of staying with the firm they were previously attached to last period. This
additional feature gives rise to the existence of a loyal customer base and a tradeoff
problem similar to that faced by firms in Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009). Incor-
porating elements of Kleshchelski and Vincent (henceforth known as KV) leads to
a clustering of firms around one price; this is different from the pricing dynamics in
HLMW, where firms are completely indifferent between charging any price in the
distribution.
KV adopt a different strategy from HLMW and assume heterogeneous cus-
tomer switching costs amongst consumers. In their model, consumers draw taste
shocks each period and have a choice to continue purchasing from the same firm
or to expend a search cost and switch to another firm. As such, firms have two
kinds of customer bases (loyals and shoppers) to attend to when deciding how to
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set their posted prices. In the presence of cost shocks, the firm tends to post more
stable prices in an effort to maintain a ”loyal” customer base. KV observe that the
amount of cost pass-through shares a non-monotonic relationship with the level of
switching costs but note that the addition of some menu cost is still necessary to
generate price stickiness in their model in response to cost shocks. In a similar vein,
Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) look at habit formation by consumers in particular
products, and find that consumers, knowing that they are partially locked-in, form
forward looking expectations and select firms that can credibly commit to not rais-
ing their price. As a consequence of consumers’ shopping behavior, price stickiness
results as an equilibrium response. This paper imposes no physical costs of price
adjustment on the part of the firm or habit formation on the consumer but instead
shows how consumer search costs and firms’ expectations of future cost states can
cause clustering around one price and hence lead to overall price stickiness.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on consumer markets and
customer loyalty as discussed in Gourio and Rudanko (2011) (henceforth known
as GR). GR acknowledge that the presence of search frictions generates long-term
customer relationships and argue that the customer base of a firm is sluggish to ad-
just. Customers are valued by firms as a form of ‘capital’ or asset. In their model,
firms face a trade-off in maximizing profits and must balance the profits gained from
expanding their customer base against the costs of attracting a new customer. In
their model, firms advertise to increase their customer base. Under a representa-
tive household setting, GR assume that all firms charge their long-term customers
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the same price, i.e. the buyer’s maximum willingness to pay. Firms, however, do
compete for new customers by offering discounts. As GR are primarily concerned
with firms’ investment behavior in response to the changes in their customer base
and the firms’ individual idiosyncratic cost shocks, they abstract from endogenous
separation of buyer-seller matches. All new customers or shoppers in a market result
from exogenous separations and no customer voluntarily leaves a firm once he has
been matched. I argue that endogenous terminations of buyer-seller relationships
are important for understanding firms’ pricing strategies and resultant overall price
stickiness. In particular, this paper models how loyal customers can act as a disci-
plining device on the firm’s amount of cost pass-through.
In the baseline version of the model, there exist both search costs and search
frictions in the market. There exists a single large household made up of a unit
measure of family members who act as buyers in the market for durable goods1.
Starting from a stationary equilibrium, each buyer is initially attached to the firm
that they were matched to in the last period. The household issues instructions to
its buyers at the start of every period on how many units of the durable good to
buy so long as the price observed is less than the household’s maximum willingness
to pay. In addition, the household also chooses a threshold switching price rule and
instructs its buyers to switch firms and search the market whenever prices are above
the threshold level. The buyers (and consequently the household) face a fixed cost
1 Note the model can be easily adjusted for non-durable goods by assuming that the depreciation
rate is equal to 1
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of search. In addition to paying this fixed cost, search in the market for durable
goods is noisy. Buyers who search have some positive probability of meeting only
one seller and some probability of meeting two sellers.2
Before markets open, firms selling the durable goods post prices to maximize
profits. High search costs imply that for some range of prices, firms are able to lock
in consumers who have previously purchased from them as it is costly for consumers
to re-search the market. At any point in time, there is an exogenous positive proba-
bility of separation. This ensures that a set of shoppers always exist in the market.
Shoppers also include consumers who upon observing the price posted by the firm
they were matched to last period, have found it optimal to break ties with that firm
and search the market. Thus, in choosing an optimal price schedule, firms face a
trade off between extracting the maximum surplus from its existing loyal customer
base, and lowering prices so as to build its customer base by attracting and retaining
shoppers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the empirical
evidence motivating this study and illustrates how an aggregate shock leads to
differential pricing dynamics for durables vs non-durable goods. Section 3 outlines
the model of this paper while Section 4 highlights how different cost assumptions
drive differing levels of price stickiness in the model . Section 5 then looks at some
2 One can generalize the model such that there is a positive probability of meeting more than one
seller. However, the possibility of the buyer encountering two sellers is enough to induce strategic
competitive pricing behavior.
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quantitative results and Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
Figures B.1 and B.2 demonstrate that both the Consumer Price Index and Per-
sonal Consumption Expenditure Price Index inflation rates for non-durable goods
tend to be more volatile than those of durable goods, suggesting more frequent price
fluctuations in non-durable goods. Even after stripping out food and energy prices
from non-durable goods, Figures B.3 and B.4 reveal that the log changes in the
CPI and PCE price indices for non-durable goods less food and energy continues
to be more volatile relative to durable goods3. The standard deviation of the CPI
inflation rate for non-durables less food and energy (0.0043) is about twice the stan-
dard deviation of the inflation rate for durable goods (0.0023). Figure B.5 shows
similar results for the PCE price indices weighted by shares of household expendi-
ture4. Figures B.6 and B.7 examine the distribution of log changes in the item-level
prices underlying the CPI and PCE price indices for durable goods and non-durable
goods less food and energy. Notably, the modal inflation rate for non-durable goods
less food and energy prices is small but positive, consistent with previous studies
using scanner data that record frequent and small positive price changes.5 In con-
trast, Figures B.6 and B.7 shows that price changes for durable goods tend to be
3 The price index for non-durable goods less food and energy was constructed using 1998-2005
ELI weights for individual product categories. Data on the ELI weights was taken from Bils and
Klenow (2004) Data Appendix
4 The shares of household expenditure were calculated using monthly PCE nominal expenditure
data. The advantage of using the ‘share-weighted’ index is that the weights are time-varying and
better able to account for potential substitution bias between product categories.
5 Using data from Dominicks, Midrigan (2011) documents many small but positive changes in
a firm’s posted price
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clustered around zero. This suggests that durable goods tend to be more price sticky.
As a quick verification, I run a simple regression estimating the amount of pass-
through of cost shocks for price indices for both durable and non-durable goods less
food and energy. Using the corresponding PPI inflation rate data as a proxy for
changes in marginal costs of final consumer goods, I run the following regression of
the log change in consumer good retail prices against current and lagged log changes






t−k + ε (2.2.1)
where ∆ represents the log change operator, PR refers to the retail price as mea-
sured by either the CPI or PCE price index, and Pw refers to the wholesale price
as proxied by the PPI. k refers to the number of lags7.
Table B.2 shows the main results from the regression. Notably, a 1 percent
increase in wholesale prices of durables goods today, as proxied by the PPI, leads
to a 0.18 percent rise in the consumer price of durable goods. Lagged wholesale
inflation of durable goods have a persistent impact on the consumer price of durable
goods; a 1 percent increase in the wholesale price of durable four periods ago in-
creases durable goods prices today by 0.16 percent. In contrast, a 1 percent rise in
6 Correspondence codes from the Supplement of Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) were used to
match CPI indices to their corresponding PPI categories. The same exercise cannot be conducted
for Services as there is insufficient PPI data on services.
7 While not shown here, I experiment with using 4, 5, 8 and 12 lags and find an optimal lag
length of 4 per Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC).
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the PPI for nondurables less food and energy today is associated with a contempo-
raneous increase of 0.30 percent in consumer prices, roughly two-thirds larger than
the contemporaneous impact for durable goods. Notably, the effect of nondurable
wholesale prices is not as persistent as for durable goods; an increase in non-durable
goods wholesale prices two quarters ago has no significant impact on today’s con-
sumer prices. This reinforces the hypothesis that non-durable goods undergo more
frequent fluctuations in price and are on average, more volatile. Table B.3 shows
the same regression results for PCE price indices. Here, the initial response of con-
sumer prices for non-durable goods less food and energy to an increase in wholesale
prices is only marginally stronger than that of durables. Nonetheless, the impact of
wholesale costs on consumer prices continues to be more persistent for durable goods.
Parsing this down to finer categories, however, it is not always the case that
prices are more flexible for non-durable goods. Table B.4 shows the median, mean,
standard deviation and persistence in the CPI inflation rates for some product
types.8 It is not evident from the reported standard deviations that non-durable
goods are necessarily more price flexible than durable goods. Inflation rates for non-
durable goods do tend to be more persistent than those of durable goods, suggesting
that once prices start to increase in non-durable good categories, they continue to
move upward in later months. In fact, it seems that the high persistence in broad
8 The full range of major product categories for both durable and non-durable goods are not
reported here. In particular, other miscellaneous non-durable goods that do not fall into a clear
broad category have been left out. In addition, the PPI data lacks sufficient coverage on services.
As such, summary statistics and pass-through coefficients have not been calculated for service
categories.
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durable goods inflation is largely driven by Transportation goods and Appliances.
Finally, Table B.4 also reports the contemporaneous pass-through in CPI inflation
rates from a 1% increase in the underlying wholesale prices. With the exception
of Transportation goods and Appliances, products with longer expected lifetimes
(as measured by a lower depreciation rate δ) tend to demonstrate less pass-through
and exhibit no contemporaneous statistical relationship between retail and whole-
sale inflation.910 Table B.5 presents the same summary statistics for PCE inflation
rates. Again, there is no discernible difference in the volatility of durable versus
non-durable inflation rates at the less aggregated level. Similar to the CPI results,
non-durable goods expected to perish within a year tend to have higher persistence
in their inflation rates. Unlike the CPI results, however, the degree of pass-through
does not seem to be related to the longevity of the good.
Finally, I conduct some vector autoregression (VAR) analyses to check whether
there is a differential response in durable goods and non-durable goods to shocks
in monetary policy. I use monthly US national accounts data on real personal
consumption expenditure and monthly CPI data for the period spanning 1959m1
through 2007m10.11 To estimate the responses to monetary policy shocks, I split
consumption expenditure into durable goods expenditure, non-durable goods expen-
9 One could argue that processed food should have a longer life-time than raw food and that
the results in Table B.4 are not inconsistent.
10 Data on δ in Tables B.4 and B.5 is taken from Bils and Klenow (1998) which documents the
expected lifetime of a product. Note that depreciation, δ, is calculated as 1 over the expected
lifetime of the product.
11 Monthly consumption expenditure data from the BEA was used whenever available. Invest-
ment data is only available on a quarterly basis. In this case, I apply cubic splines to get estimates
of monthly investment data. Monthly CPI data is publicly available from the BLS.
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diture and services expenditure, and run separate parsimonious five-variable VAR
for these three consumption series. For durables, my five-variable VAR includes
curent and four lags of real personal consumption expenditure on durables (LDUR),
the consumer price index for durables (LCPIDUR), the CRB BLS spot price index
for 22 sensitive material prices (LCRB), the federal funds rate (FF), and the loga-
rithm of M1 money holdings (LM1).1213 Specifications for non-durables and services
are similar.
I identify impulse responses by applying a Cholesky decomposition to the
VAR. The main policy variable in the regression is the Federal Funds Rate (FF). I
assumse that the monetary authority observes durable goods expenditure (LDUR),
the aggregate price of durable goods (LCPID), and the spot price index for sen-
sitive commodities (LCRB) before setting the Federal Funds Rate.14 Under this
assumption, real expenditure on durable goods and price indices do not change on
initial impact of the monetary shock. This assumption allows me to identify the
impact of a monetary policy disturbance on the output and price variables. In
contrast, money holdings (LM1) are assumed to respond immediately to shocks to
FF. The regressions were conducted over the period 1959M1:2007M10. Bootstrap
12 LCRB is similar to the PCOMM price index that Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans use in
their paper. The CRB BLS spot price index was obtained from a dataset publicly made available
on www.economagic.com. The VAR regression for non-durables and services follows the same
configuration as that of durable goods expenditure; where appropriate, real personal consumption
expenditure numbers on nondurables (LNONDUR) and services (LSER), and the consumer price
indices for non-durables (LCPINONDUR) and services (LCPISER) replaced the values for LDUR
and LCPIDUR.
13 Lag length was chosen using the AIC.
14 Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) make a similar assumption in their paper where
they argue that real GDP expenditure and the GDP deflator is known but with delay.
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simulations were conducted for 100 re-samplings of the data and used to construct
the confidence bands for the impulse response functions . Similar exercises were
conducted using the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) Price Indices for
durables, non-durable goods and services.
Figures B.8 and B.9 present the impulse responses of real consumption expen-
diture and CPI prices following a positive interest rate shock from the three separate
five-variable VAR regressions. Notably, durable goods expenditure observes a sharp
drop-off relative relative to non-durable goods and services expenditure. By the
end of the first year, durable goods expenditure drops by 1.3% and only bottoms
out by 40 months after the initial monetary shock. In contrast, real consumption
expenditures on non-durable goods and services decline by only 0.1% one year after
the shock and do not decline by more than 0.3% in the subsequent periods. Note
that Figure B.9 displays a price puzzle similar to that noted by Sims (1992). Be-
cause of this apparent price puzzle, I focus on what happens to the response in
prices from months 30 and beyond. Figure B.9 demonstrates that the CPI for non-
durables goods falls below its initial value 32 months after the shock while the CPI
for durables continues to increase. Put simply, the price puzzle is resolved much
faster for non-durable goods than for durable goods. Figures B.10 and B.11 present
the impulse responses when PCE price indices were used in place of the CPI. Similar
to the CPI results, durable goods expenditure shows a sharp drop-off in response to
the shock while there exists negligible change in non-durable and services expendi-
tures. In addition, the PCE price index for non-durables observes a faster correction
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than for durable goods.
The above VAR analyses assume that the only consumer good in the economy
is either a durable good, non-durable good or a service ‘good’. A more realis-
tic description of the economy should encompass these three different categories
of consumption expenditure and allow for interaction or substitution effects. To
this end,I formulate a ten-variable VAR using the logarithms of real personal con-
sumption expenditure on durables (LDUR), real personal consumption expenditure
on non-durables (LNONDUR), real personal consumption expenditure on services
(LSER), real private investment expenditure (LINV), the consumer price index for
durables (LCPIDUR), the consumer price index for non-durables (LCPINONDUR),
the consumer price index for services (LCPISER), an investment expenditure de-
flator (LINVDEF), the CRB BLS spot price index of 22 sensitive material prices
(LCRB), and the federal funds rate (FF). The VAR is conducted with a lag order
of 4 over the same time period of 1959M1 - 2007M10. The identification strategy
assumes that the federal funds rate is the main policy instrument and that the mon-
etary authority sets the federal funds rate only after observing all expenditures and
their relevant prices.
Figure B.12 shows the results from the ten-variable VAR analysis. There are a
few features that stand out from this analysis. The typical hump-shaped responses
in both consumption and investment spending to monetary shocks are captured in
these results. The decline in non-durables and services consumption expenditure is,
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however, negligible compared to the drop in durables and investment spending. Fig-
ure B.13 is a magnified view of the impulse responses in consumption expenditures
from the same VAR analyses. The trends in the different categories of consumption
expenditure are similar to the results seen earlier in the parsimonious five-VAR re-
gression. Noticeably, durable goods expenditure declines by 1.7% 12 months after
the shock, while non-durable goods and services expenditure decline only 0.2% after
12 months. More interestingly, inclusion of the different categories of consumption
expenditure in the full 10-variable VAR specification gives us different effects on
prices. Figure B.14 is a magnified view of the impulse responses in CPI for the
different consumption expenditure groups. Unlike the result from the earlier five-
variable regressions, Figure B.14 shows that in the full VAR specification, durable
goods prices demonstrate very little change relative to the prices for non-durable
goods and services. The CPI for non-durable goods and services return to their
initial level 14 and 29 months after the interest rate shock while the CPI for durable
goods only corrects itself 35 months after the shock.
Figure B.15 shows the results from same 10-variable VAR analysis using PCE
price indices instead. Figures B.16 and B.17 provide magnified views of the im-
pulse responses in consumption and PCE price indices respectively. The trends
in consumption expenditure and their corresponding price indices are similar to
those in the CPI specification. Again, consumption expenditure on durables ob-
serves a steeper hump-shaped decline following the monetary shock while durable
goods prices exhibit very little adjustment. These findings highlight that there is
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significant variation between the price responses in durables vs. non-durable goods
towards shocks in monetary policy. I proceed to explain these differences with the
model suggested in the next section.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Household’s Problem
There is a single, infinitely-lived large household in this model. In every pe-
riod, the household consumes both a consumer good, Ct, and a durable good, Dt.
The consumer good is sold in a Walrasian market at a competitive price of qt. The
household has a measure one of family members that act as buyers in the decentral-
ized market for the durable good. At the start of each period, each buyer is attached
to the durable goods firm that he was matched with in the last period, and observes
the price posted by that firm without cost. The buyer then has a choice of whether
to stay with that durable goods seller or to separate and search the market. Each
buyer is only allowed to search the market once every period, and buyers incur a
fixed cost of κ whenever they separate from their current firm and search the market
for an alternative seller. There is no perfect recall and buyers cannot return to the
seller they were previously attached to once the choice has been made to search
the market. In addition, there is an exogenous separation shock that occurs with
probability λ, indicating that at any point in time, there are at least λ buyers in the
market who are constrained to be shoppers. These shoppers also face the same fixed
cost of κ when they search for a new firm. Once buyers choose to search the market,
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there is a probability of α that the buyer only meets one seller and a probability of
(1− α) that the buyer meets two sellers15.
The household knows the distribution of prices, F (p), but does not know the
exact price posted by each seller prior to sending out its buyers into the decentral-
ized market. Therefore, in purchasing the durable good, the household takes the
price distribution as given and gives the following set of instructions:
1. Observe the posted price of the firm j that the buyer was matched with from
the previous period.
2a If the posted price pj > p
r, leave the matched firm from the previous period,
pay κ and search the decentralized market for an alternative seller.
2b If the posted price pj ≤ pr, stay with the seller from last period and do not
search the market.
3. If search results in meeting two sellers, match with the seller who has the lower
price. If search results in meeting with one seller, match with that seller.
4. Upon matching with a seller k, buy one unit of the durable good if pk ≤ p̄.
Otherwise, buy zero units of the good.
15 While it is possible to extend the model to allow the buyer to have some positive probability
of meeting more than one seller, it is useful to note that the possibility of meeting two sellers is
sufficient enough to induce strategic price competitive behaviour amongst firms. This is shown
formally in Burdett and Judd (1983)
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Here, pj is the price posted by firm j, p̄ is the household’s maximum willingness to
pay for one unit of the durable good and pr represents the threshold price above
which the buyer leaves the seller it was previously attached to and searches the
market. Since the buyer only purchases one unit of the durable good each period
whenever pj ≤ p̄, this implies that the household’s total expenditure on the durable
good is equivalent to
∫ p̄
p
η̂(p)pdF (p) where p is the lowest price durable goods firms
would choose to offer. η̂(p) corresponds to the mass of buyers that purchase one
unit of the durable good at price p. Since there is a possibility that more than one
firm charges the same price, equation 2.3.1 provides the link between the mass of
customers that each firm charging p has at the end of the period with the total mass




where ηj,t(p) is the mass of customers matched at the end of period t with firm
j charging price p. At the end of each period, after buyers have completed their
transactions, they return to the household to pool their purchases of the durable
good. Assuming a single large household and pooling of durable goods purchases
implies that there is perfect risk sharing and hence only a single household durable
good history, aggregate Dt, to track. Accordingly, the household’s stock of durables
evolves according to the following equations:
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and given a unit measure of buyers, it must be the case that:
0 ≤ Xt ≤ 1 (2.3.4)
where δ is the rate of depreciation. In choosing the optimal amount of durable good,
Xt, to purchase each period, the household is effectively optimizing with respect to
p̄, the maximum price he is willing to pay in the market. Given that buyers always
buy one unit of the good as long as the price encountered p is less than or equals to
p̄, and because the household takes the price distribution as given, optimizing with
respect to p̄ is equivalent to choosing the total amount of Xt the household would
like to purchase that period. Moreover, the household seeks to maximize his util-
ity from the consumption of both the consumer good and the durable good given
his budget constraint; this is analogous to the household solving an expenditure
minimization problem where it chooses the threshold price rule for which buyers
must switch sellers whenever they observe price p above pr. Thus, in setting up
the household’s problem, the optimal level of Xt can be obtained by solving for the
optimal pricing rules of p̄ and pr.
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Hence, while the price distribution, F (p), is stationary in equilibrium, the dis-
persion of prices and mass of firms offering a particular price p are affected by the
household’s optimal choice of p̄ and pr. This implies that η̂(p) is an equilibrium
object that is a function of both p̄ and pr. Deriving formal expressions for η̂(p) and
ηj,t requires an examination of the firm’s problem, which is discussed in the subse-
quent section. For the time-being, it important to stress that the mass of customers
purchasing the good at price p, i.e. η(p), crucially depends on the household’s choice
of pr, the threshold switching price.
In order to examine how prices respond to monetary policy in an environment
where search is costly, I consider a money in the utility (MIU) model.16 Households
receive utility both from the consumption of consumer and durable goods and from
holding money, and suffer disutility from supplying their labor. The household is
also the single shareholder of all consumer and durable goods firms in the market.
Formally, the household problem can be written as:
V (Mt−1, Bt−1, Dt−1) = maxu(Ct) + ν(Dt) +µ(Mt)−Lt + βEV (Mt, Bt, Dt) (2.3.5)
s.t.
16 An earlier version of this paper built heavily on the Lagos-Wright framework used in HLMW,
this has since been modified as the insurance derived from the rebalancing of money holdings
under the Lagos-Wright structure is equivalently accomplished in the assumption of a single large
household, i.e. money holdings collapse to a degenerate distribution in both models.
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Mt +Bt + qtCt +
∫ p̄
p




t + Tt − κN st
(2.3.6)
and equations (2.3.2),(2.3.3), (2.3.4).
where the Mt and Bt refer to the household’s holdings of money and bonds in period
t, and wtLt is the nominal wage income the household receives from supplying labor
Lt to the market. Accordingly, the real wage is defined as ωt = wt/P where P is the
aggregate price level. Πct and Π
d
t are the aggregate dividend profits the household
receives from the consumer good and durable good firms respectively, while Tt is a






ηj,t−1(p)I(pj,t = p)dj}dF (p)} of buyers choose to switch firms every
period, where ηj,t−1(p) is the mass of customers that were attached to firm j at the
end of last period. This implies a mass of shoppers, N st , in the decentralized market
for durable goods in each period t. Formally, N st is given as





ηj,t−1(p)I(pj,t = p)dj}dF (p)) + λ (2.3.7)
The first component in N st describes the mass of “buyers” who are not exogenously
separated from the firm they were matched to last period but who voluntarily choose
to leave the firm because the price charged by the firm is above the household’s
threshold switching price. The second component of N st consists of the buyers who
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are constrained to become shoppers every period because of some exogenous shock
of separation. Accordingly, the total nominal cost of search incurred by the house-
hold is κN st .





Mt +Bt + qtCt +
∫ p̄
p
η̂(p)pdF (p)−Mt−1−Rt−1Bt−1−Πct −Πdt −Tt +κN st
)
(2.3.8)
Using equation (2.3.8), we can re-write the household’s problem as:








− Mt−1 −Rt−1Bt−1 − Πct − Πdt − Tt + κN st
)
+ βEV (Mt, Bt, Dt)
The household chooses {Ct,Mt, Bt, p̄, pr} to maximize (2.3.9). Before solving
for the household’s optimality conditions, it is useful to describe the firm’s problem





The problem of the consumer good firm is standard. The consumer goods
firm faces a linear production function f(Lt) = AtLt, and hires labor at nominal
wage wt . Consumer goods are purchased by both the household and durable goods
firms. The latter buys the consumer good as an input and converts it into a durable
good at some cost qtz, where qt is the price of the consumer good. There are no
search frictions in the consumer goods market. This gives us the following set-up
for consumer goods firm’s profit function:
πct = qtAtLt − wtLt (2.3.10)
Solving the consumer goods firm’s problem, we get:
qtAt = wt (2.3.11)
As the consumer good is an input in the production of the durable good, equa-
tion (2.3.11) provides us the link as to how aggregate shocks can affect the pricing of
durable goods. Notably, any negative TFP shock (a smaller At) directly affects the
ratio wt
qt




There is a mass n of durable goods firm in the decentralized market. At the
start of each period, durable goods firms purchase consumer goods from the con-
sumer good firm. The durable goods firm possesses a linear production technology
that allows him to convert one unit of the consumer good into one unit of the durable
good. For simplicity, I assume that all firms face the same constant marginal cost.
The cost for firm j of converting a consumer good into a durable good every period
is thus given by qtz. Durable goods firms observe qt as well as the exogenous prob-
ability of separation λ before posting prices to maximize expected profits.
As aforementioned, buyers that choose to search the market have some posi-
tive probability α of meeting only one firm and probability (1− α) of meeting two
firms. The presence of search frictions implies that a firm cannot capture the whole
market even if he cuts prices to marginal cost, while the positive probability of a
buyer meeting two firms implies that charging the monopoly price is not necessarily
always optimal. In addition, each firm starts off the period with a mass of “base”
customers who purchased from him last period. In choosing the optimal price to
post, the firm encounters a trade-off in setting prices between extracting the max-
imum surplus from the customer base or setting prices such that he attracts the
maximum number of customers.









ηj,t = (1− λ)ηj,t−1I{pj,t ≤ pr}+
N st
n
[α + 2(1− α)(1− F (p))] (2.3.13)
and
πDj,t(ηj,t−1) = ηj,t(pj,t − qtz) (2.3.14)
where the first term of equation 2.3.12 represents the current profits of the durable
goods firm and the second term denotes its continuation value. ηj,t refers to the
mass of customers a firm j attracts at the end of each period and equation (2.3.13)
represents its law of motion. The mass of customers a firm can attract is made
up of two components. Firstly, ηj,t−1(1 − λ) is the mass of base customers a firm
j has after the separation shock occurs. Because buyers only stay with the firm if
prices are below pr, the total number of base customers that stay with a firm is
(1−λ)ηj,t−1I{pj ≤ pr}. The second term on the RHS of equation (2.3.13) represents
the mass of shoppers a firm j is able to attract and sell to in period t. N st is the total
mass of shoppers in the market. Since there is a positive mass of n durable goods




The existence of search frictions, however, implies that
Nst
n
α of shoppers meet only
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with firm j. Correspondingly,
Nst
n
2(1−α)(1−F (p)) represents the mass of shoppers
firm j is able to attract if buyers meet two sellers in the market when they search.
Note that while (1 − α) is the probability that that the shopper meets two firms,
(1−F (p)) is the probability that the other firm charges a higher price. Finally, the
current profit per customer enjoyed by firm j is given by pj,t − qtz while βEJ(ηj,t)
represents the firm’s continuation value.
The evolution of the customer base as described by equation (2.3.13) and the
role of pr point toward the importance of the consumer search method for firms’
pricing decisions. There is a discontinuity in the mass of buyers when prices in-
crease from pr to pr + ε where ε → 0+; no firm can retain a base customer if he
charges above pr. Thus, the household’s threshold switching price rule plays an
important role in dictating firms’ strategic pricing decisions.
Given the price distribution F (p) and the household’s pricing rule, the firm’s
decision of whether or not to set prices so as to retain base customers is inherently
dependent on the cost parameters assumed in the model. Under different assump-
tions on the persistence and probability of being in a high cost state, a firm may
choose to sacrifice his customer base in order to maximize lifetime profits.
2.3.3 Government
To account for money holdings, there is also a government in this economy.
The role of the government in this economy is to print money and issue non-state
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contingent bonds. Accordingly, the government’s budget constraint takes the fol-
lowing form:
Mt +Bt = Tt +Mt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1 (2.3.15)
where
Mt = (1 + ξt)Mt−1 (2.3.16)
2.3.4 Equilibrium Conditions
Given the equilibrium price distribution, I return now to the household’s prob-
lem and solve for the optimality conditions. Recall that the mass of buyers purchas-




where ηj,t(p) is given by equation (2.3.13). For ease of exposition we can rewrite the
total amount of durable goods purchased this period, i.e. Xt =
∫ p̄
p
η̂(p)dF (p) in the
following manner and apply Leibniz’s rule when taking first order conditions with













[α + 2(1− α)(1− F (p))]
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pη̂(p)dF (p). X̃t is the household’s investment expenditure
on new durable goods this period. Returning to the household’s problem in equa-
tion (2.3.9) and taking first order conditions with respect to {Ct,Mt, Bt, p̄, pr}, the




[Mt +Bt + qtCt +
∫ p̄
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Equation (2.3.19) gives us the household’s optimality condition for labor and
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equation (2.3.20) is the household’s optimal consumption of consumer goods. Equa-
tions (2.3.21) and (2.3.22) give us the household’s optimal holdings of money and
bonds respectively. Equation (2.3.23) is the household’s first order condition with
respect to p̄, where p̄ affects the total amount of Xt the household buys in equi-
librium. Equation (2.3.24) implicitly gives us the household’s threshold switching





≥ 0 and dX̃t
dp̄t
> 0. Equation
(2.3.23) highlights that the marginal benefit of increasing the maximum price the
household is willing to pay for durable goods is higher than the marginal benefit
of increasing his maximum willingness to pay for non-durable goods (in which case
δ = 1). Intuitively, this arises because raising the maximum willingness to pay for
durable goods today increases the stock of durable goods the household has available
to eat from tomorrow. This in turn reduces the amount of resources the household
expends on search in the future. In contrast, there is no stock of non-durable goods
that the household may consume from tomorrow. All else equal, this implies that
the maximum willingness to pay and the dispersion of prices observed for durable
goods may be larger relative to that of non-durables.
Recall from the consumer firm’s problem, the following equilibrium conditions
results:
qtAt = wt (2.3.25)
Equation (2.3.25) implies that the consumer goods firm earns zero profits in
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equilibrium, so that Πct = 0 in every period. The durable goods firms’ optimal
choice of pj,t characterizes the equilibrium price distributions given specific cost







where πj,t(p) refers to the firm’s current profit at the end of period t. The household,
being the single shareholder of all firms, receives this lump-sum transfer of profits
from the durable goods firms at the end of every period.
Combining these equations together with the government’s budget constraint
as given in equation 2.3.15, we get the following feasibility constraint:
qtALt + Π
D
t = qtCt + X̃t + κN
s
t (2.3.27)
Equation (2.3.27) says that all nominal expenditure must equal nominal GDP.
2.4 Steady State Equilibrium Conditions
A stationary monetary equilibrium is defined by a sequence of quantities
{M∗, D∗, C∗, B∗, L∗} and prices {q∗t , w∗t , Ft(p)∗} such that:
1 M ′∗, C∗, B′∗, H∗ solve the household’s problem and satisfy equations (2.3.20),
(2.3.21), (2.3.22) and (2.3.8).
2 D′∗, X∗, p̄∗, pr∗ solve the household’s problem in the decentralized market for
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durable goods and satisfy equations (2.3.2), (2.3.3), (2.3.4), (2.3.23) and (2.3.24).
3 The consumer good firm pays labor input its marginal product:
q∗A = w∗ (2.4.1)
As such, total profits from the consumer good firm are equal to zero, Π∗c = 0.
4 From the consumer good firm’s problem, the feasibility constraint holds:
q∗AL∗ + Π∗D = q∗C∗ + X̃∗ + κN∗s
5 The price distribution, F (p) is consistent with the solution to the durable
goods firm’s problem.








7 Household money holdings are equivalent to the total money supplied by the
government. The government budget constraint holds.
M
′∗ +B
′∗ = (1 + ξ)M∗ +R∗B∗ + T ∗
8 In steady state, nominal variables increase at the rate of money growth, ξ,
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while real variables are constant, i.e.
M




′∗ = (1 + ξ)w∗, q
′∗ = (1 + ξ)q∗
and
D
′∗ = D∗ = Dss, C∗ = Css
X∗ = Xss = δDss, L∗ = Lss
2.5 Distribution assumptions
2.5.1 No Loyal Customer Base
The model with non-durable goods, constant marginal cost and no loyal cus-
tomer base among all firms collapses to the price dispersion observed in Burdett-
Judd (1983). In this case, all buyers are shoppers, N s = 1 and all firms are indifferent
between charging any price in the distribution F (p) with support over [p, p̄]. The
price distribution in this case collapses to the following:
F (p) =





p−p if p ≤ p ≤ p̄
1 else
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HLMW establish that prices can be sticky at the micro-level but flexible in the
aggregate in response to monetary policy shocks when there exist search frictions in
a “Burdett-Judd” product market with no loyal customer base. That is, the aggre-
gate price distribution shifts rightward with a positive monetary policy shock (an
increase in the interest rate), and hence monetary policy is neutral. In the results
section, I replicate this exercise and show that the same results arise in my model
when we assume no loyal customer base.
2.5.2 With Loyal Customers
In contrast, the model with the retention of a customer base presents interest-
ing dynamics. Consider the case where marginal costs are again constant but firms
are allowed to retain a loyal customer base so long as they do not raise their price
above the threshold switching price pr. Note that when all firms have the same
marginal cost, no firm would have an incentive to set price p > pr if z < pr.
Claim 1. Given constant marginal cost, no firm has an incentive to charge above
the reservation threshold switching price prt .
To see this, suppose there are two firms, both of which have customer base
ηj,t−1 at the start of time t and constant marginal cost z. Suppose also that one
firm chooses to charge p′ = pr + ε. Then accordingly the value function for the firm





[α + 2(1− α)(1− F (p′))](p′ − qtz) + βEJ(ηj,t)
In contrast, a firm that charges prt gets to retain his customer base, which






[α + 2(1− α)(1− F (pr))]
}
(pr − qtz) + βEJ(ηRj,t)
As ε→ 0 and given continuous F (p), F (p′) ≈ F (pr) for small enough ε. It is
clear that for small enough ε, J(pr, ηj,t−1) > J(p
′, ηj,t−1) as the firm charging p
r gets
to enjoy additional profits from catering to current base customers as well as well as
attracting new customers to enhance future profits. Thus, firms are indifferent be-
tween charging any price within the distribution of F (p) which is bounded between
[p, pr]. In the model with no cost heterogeneity, the upper bound p̄ is the same as
the threshold switching price, pr. This implies that the mass of shoppers consists
those who were exogenously separated from their current firm, i.e. N st = λ for all t.
Importantly, firms with the same customer base are indifferent between charg-
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ing any price from the following conditional price distribution for all p ∈ [p, pr]:























where ηRj,t represents the customer base the firm carries into the next period when
he charges the maximum price the customer is willing to pay, here p̄ = pr. Notably,
the first line of Equation (2.5.1) resembles the price distribution in a product market
with no customer base. The second line of Equation (2.5.1), however, shows that
the assumption of a customer base modifies the price distribution. In allowing for
the retention of a customer base, the firm’s problem is no longer static and the
size of the customer base from the last period becomes an important state variable.
Note that only firms with the same initial customer base are indifferent between
charging any price from the conditional price distribution F (p|ηj,t−1). To recover
the unconditional price distribution, one must aggregate across the distribution of
firms over its initial customer base.
2.6 Computation
2.6.1 Computational Method
The following algorithm is applied to compute the equilibrium price distribu-
tion of the economy.
1 Guess an equilibrium price distribution, F0(p).
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2 Start from the steady state and solve the household’s equilibrium conditions
given the price distribution. Find the threshold pricing rule from the house-
hold’s optimality condition.
3 Guess a value function, J0, given the firm’s profit function
4 Solve the durable good firm’s problem: find the range of prices that maximizes
profits given pR, the price distribution and the initial guess of the firm’s value
function, J0.
5 Calculate an updated guess of the firm’s value function J1. Repeat steps 4-5
until J1 − J0 → ε where ε→ 0.
6 Given the optimal range of prices firms are willing to charge, update guess of
F0(p).
7 Repeat process until convergence.
2.7 Preliminary Results
2.7.1 No Cost Heterogeneity
Table A.11 summarizes the parameter values used for the quantitative exercise.
I assume the following utility functions for the consumption of {Ct, Dt,Mt} respec-
tively: u(Ct) =
(Ct)1−γc
1−γc , ν(Dt) =
(Dt)1−γd
1−γd
and µ(Mt) = log(Mt). To examine how
a monetary price shock affects the price distribution of sellers, I first look at what
happens in a “Burdett-Judd” market, i.e. a product market with search frictions, no
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cost heterogeneity, and no customer base. Figure ?? replicates the result of HLMW
and shows that the price distribution shifts rightward with a one-time permanent
positive monetary policy shock, i.e. with an increase in the growth rate of money.
Thus, while some sellers are able to maintain the same prices and exhibit price rigid-
ity, the aggregate price distribution on average is flexible. Only sellers who no longer
remain within the support of the new price distribution Ft+1(p) are forced to reprice.
Figure B.19 shows the difference in price distributions between durables ver-
sus non-durables goods, i.e. when δ < 1 and δ = 1 respectively. Notably, the
price distribution for durable goods has a much larger support. This is consistent
with equation (2.3.23) which demonstrates that the marginal cost of increasing the
household’s maximum willing to pay must be equal to its marginal benefit. Since
raising the maximum willingness to pay enables the household to add to its stock
of durable goods available tomorrow, the maximum willingness to pay for a durable
good is higher than that observed for a non-durable good.
Figure B.20 shows the same experiment in a model where firms are now allowed
to retain a loyal customer base so long as they do not charge above the threshold
switching price prt . When firms are allowed to retain loyal customers, increasing M
is no longer neutral. Importantly, while the lower support of the price distribution
shifts rightward with the increase in nominal marginal costs, Figure B.20 shows that
the whole price distribution does not shift rightward. The potential loss of a cus-
tomer base causes prices to remain sticky at the upper end of the price distribution.
Firms who used to charge between [p, p′] are forced to reprice as before. However,
154
firms also know that so long as they charge below pr, they can retain their loyal
customer base. Since firms earn substantially lower profits from charging p > pr,
prices are sticky at the upper end of the price distribution. Because the household
acts like a monopsonist and has price-setting power over pr, the household is able to
exert bargaining power and control the rise in pr. When marginal costs rise due to
the interest rate shock, the household does re-price pr, however, the increase in pr is
much smaller than observed in the model with no customer base. Here, pr increases
marginally from 8.6 to 8.65 while in the model with no customer base, pr rises from
8.6 to about 8.9.
2.8 Conclusion
The model considered thus far has many testable implications. In particular,
the model derives a clean rule for how firms are affected by consumers’ search meth-
ods as firms internalize the threshold switching price of households and can engage in
price sticky regimes to retain customers. This paper has also highlighted a tractable
way of explaining how the longevity of a product may affect the pricing decision of
firms as well as the size of mark-ups. By examining the durability of the product
and how it affects customers’ maximum willingness to pay, this paper also shows
how firms’ mark-ups are constrained by the expected lifetime of a good. While the
numerical examples above highlight the importance of the customer base in terms of
generating non-neutral responses to money, future work will focus on using micro-
level data on the frequency of household purchases as well as the transacted prices
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paid for durable vs. non-durable goods to discipline the model.
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Chapter B: Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Household Equilibrium Conditions









































The envelope conditions are given by:








Vd(Mt−1, Bt−1, Dt−1) =
(































Updating equation (B.1.8) and plugging it into equation B.1.4, we get back
equation 2.3.23.


























































































(1− λ)ηj,t−1I(pj,t = pr)djf(pr)
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B.2 Tables and Figures
Tab. B.1: Flexible and Sticky Prices in the CPI Market
Basket
Item Frequency Rel. Importance Type
Motor fuel 0.7 3.2 Non-durable
Car and truck rental 1.2 0.1 Service
Fresh fruits and vegetables 1.3 0.9 Non-durable
Fuel oil and other fuels 1.5 0.3 Non-durable
Gas and electricity 1.6 4.2 Service
Meats, poultry, fish, and eggs 1.9 1.9 Non-durable
Used cars and trucks 2.0 1.6 Durable
Leased cars and trucks 2.0 0.6 Service
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table B.1 – Continued
Item Frequency Rel. Importance Type
New vehicles 2.0 4.5 Durable
Women’s and girls’ apparel 2.3 1.5 Non-durable
Dairy and related products 2.6 0.9 Non-durable
Nonalcoholic beverages, beverage materials 2.7 1.0 Non-durable
Lodging away from home 3.1 2.5 Service
Processed fruits and vegetables 3.2 0.3 Non-durable
Men’s and boys’ apparel 3.2 0.9 Non-durable
Cereals and bakery products 3.3 1.2 Non-durable
Footwear 3.4 0.7 Non-durable
Other food at home 3.6 2.0 Non-durable
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table B.1 – Continued
Item Frequency Rel. Importance Type
Jewelry and watches 3.9 0.4 Durable
Motor vehicle parts and equipment 4.1 0.4 Durable
Tobacco and smoking products 4.2 0.8 Non-durable
Infants’ and toddlers’ apparel 5.3 0.2 Non-durable
Household furnishings and operations 5.3 4.8 Durable
Motor vehicle maintenance and repair 5.8 1.2 Service
Motor vehicle insurance 5.9 2.0 Service
Medical care commodities 6.2 1.6 Non-durable
Personal care products 6.7 0.7 Non-durable
Alcoholic beverages 7.3 1.1 Non-durable
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table B.1 – Continued
Item Frequency Rel. Importance Type
Recreation 7.9 5.7 Durable
Miscellaneous personal goods 8.1 0.2 -
Communication 8.4 3.2 Service
Public transportation 9.4 1.1 Service
Tenants’ and household insurance 10.1 0.3 Service
Food away from home 10.7 6.5 Service
Rent of primary residence 11.0 6.0 Service
Education 11.1 3.1 Service
Medical care services 14.0 4.8 Service
Water, sewer, trash collection services 14.3 1.0 Service
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table B.1 – Continued
Item Frequency Rel. Importance Type
Motor vehicle fees 16.4 0.5 Service
Personal care services 23.7 0.6 Service
Miscellaneous personal services 25.9 1.1 Service
0 Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Bils and Klenow (2004)
Table from Cleveland Fed Research Note: http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/commentary/2010/2010-
2.cfm
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Tab. B.2: Pass-Through Results: CPI
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)






























Standard errors reported in parenthesis. †, ∗, ∗∗ refer to 10%, 5% and
1% significance levels respectively. Pr refers to the retail price (CPI)
while Pw refers to the corresponding wholesale price as proxied by the
PPI
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Tab. B.3: Pass-through Results: PCE
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)





























Standard errors reported in parenthesis. †, ∗, ∗∗ refer to 10%, 5% and
1% significance levels respectively. Pr refers to the retail price (PCE
price index) while Pw refers to the corresponding wholesale price as
proxied by the PPI
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Tab. B.4: Summary Statistics of CPI Inflation (1986m1-2007m12)
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev AR(1) Pass-thru δ
Durables 0 0.0002 0.0023 0.415∗∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.1
(0.0403) (0.024)
Non-Durables 0.0019 0.0020 0.0043 -0.066 0.304∗∗ 1
(0.043) (0.060)
Raw Food 0.0026 0.0038 0.013 0.130∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 1
(0.024) (0.023)
Processed Food 0.0018 0.0021 0.0027 0.207∗∗ 0.068 1
(0.037) (0.053)
Gas 0.0026 0.0048 0.0342 0.463∗∗ 0.380∗∗ 1
(0.027) (0.016)
Apparel 0.0019 0.0016 0.0043 0.231∗∗ 0.095 0.34
(0.0254) (0.033)
Medical Commodities 0.0043 0.0045 0.0034 0.286∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 1
(0.034) (0.017)
Personal Care 0.0025 0.0029 0.0047 0.159∗∗ -
(0.042)
Household Furnishing 0.0024 0.0020 0.0062 0.028 0.046 0.11
(0.043) (0.075)
Recreation 0.0010 0.0012 0.0018 0.009 0.078 0.11
(0.076) (0.068)
Video & Audio 0 0.0004 0.0033 0.080 -0.008 0.08
(0.072) (0.040)
Appliances -0.0010 -0.00090 0.0044 0.416∗∗ 0.259† 0.08
(0.084) (0.132)
Transportation 0.0032 0.0033 0.0079 0.332∗∗ 0.234∗∗ 0.11
(0.018) (0.044)
Summary statistics reported for major product categories. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. †, ∗, ∗∗ refer to 10%, 5% and 1%
significance levels respectively. Data on δ taken from Bils and Klenow (1998). δ is calculated as 1 over the expected lifetime of the
product. Information on the expected lifetime of personal care products is unavailable. Pass-through for personal care products is
also not calculated as there lacks direct 1 to 1 correspondence with the PPI indices. Non-durables are less food and energy
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Tab. B.5: Summary Statistics of PCE Inflation (1959m1-2007m12)
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev AR(1) Pass-thru δ
Durables 0.0010 0.0011 0.0034 0.256∗∗ 0.201∗∗ 0.1
(0.032) (0.024)
Non-durables 0.0023 0.0023 0.0036 0.055∗ 0.228∗∗ 1
(0.028) (0.045)
Raw Food 0.0019 0.0029 0.0113 0.208∗∗ 0.298∗∗ 1
(0.022) (0.024)
Processed Food 0.0023 0.0030 0.0045 0.424∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 1
(0.027) (0.021)
Gas 0.0019 0.0042 0.0314 0.427∗∗ 0.368∗∗ 1
(0.023) (0.016)
Apparel 0.0014 0.0011 0.0045 0.140∗∗ -0.511 0.34
(0.030) (0.995)
Medical Commodities 0.0029 0.0030 0.0033 0.325∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 1
(0.038) (0.018)
Personal Care 0.0020 0.0022 0.0045 0.041 - -
(0.035)
Household Furnishing 0.0011 0.0013 0.0038 0.152∗∗ 0.254∗∗ 0.11
(0.036) (0.056)
Recreation -0.0008 -0.0012 0.0047 0.189∗∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.11
(0.026) (0.042)
Video & Audio -0.0014 -0.0024 0.0051 0.218∗∗ 0.012 0.08
(0.027) (0.033)
Appliances 0.0001 0.0007 0.0046 0.237∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.08
(0.033) (0.040)
Transportation 0.0019 0.0020 0.0049 0.222∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.11
(0.027) (0.030)
Summary statistics reported for major product categories. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. †, ∗, ∗∗ refer to 10%, 5% and 1%
significance levels respectively. Data on δ taken from Bils and Klenow (1998). δ is calculated as 1 over the expected lifetime of the
product. Information on the expected lifetime of personal care products is unavailable. Pass-through for personal care products is
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Fig. B.7: Distribution of Monthly Log Change in Prices, PCE
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Fig. B.8: Impulse Response in Real Consumption Expenditures, 5-VAR CPI specification
176




















Fig. B.9: Impulse Response in Prices, 5-VAR CPI specification
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Fig. B.10: Impulse Response in Real Consumption Expenditures,5-VAR PCE specification
178



































































0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50
0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50






95% CI impulse response function (irf)
Impulse response to 1 s.d. interest rate shock
Fig. B.12: Impulse Response to 1 sd shock in the Federal Funds Rate, 10-VAR CPI spec-
ification
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Fig. B.13: Impulse Response in Real Consumption Expenditures, 10-VAR CPI specifica-
tion
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95% CI impulse response function (irf)
Impulse response to 1 s.d. interest rate shock
Fig. B.15: Impulse Response to 1 sd shock in the Federal Funds Rate, 10-VAR PCE
specification
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Fig. B.16: Impulse Response in Real Consumption Expenditures, 10-VAR PCE specifica-
tion
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Fig. B.17: Impulse Response in Prices, 10-VAR PCE specification
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No Loyals, Positive Monetary Shock
Fig. B.18: Change in Price Distribution With No Loyal Customer Base





















Fig. B.19: Durables Price dispersion vs. Non-durables, No Loyal Customer Base
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Positive Monetary Policy Shock Shifts Up Price Distribution
 
 
With Loyals,No Monetary Shock
With Loyals, Positive Monetary Shock
Fig. B.20: Change in Price Distribution with Loyal Customer Base
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